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POLICE OR PIRATES? REFORMING WASHINGTON’S
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE SYSTEM
Jasmin Chigbrow*
Abstract: Civil asset forfeiture laws permit police officers to seize property they suspect is
connected to criminal activity and sell or retain the property for the police department’s use.
In many states, including Washington, civil forfeiture occurs independent of any criminal
case—many property owners are never charged with the offense police allege occurred.
Because the government is not required to file criminal charges, property owners facing civil
forfeiture lack the constitutional safeguards normally guaranteed to defendants in the criminal
justice system: the right to an attorney, the presumption of innocence, the government’s burden
to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and protection from double jeopardy, among
others.
Washington’s civil forfeiture laws currently provide minimal legal protection for property
owners and contain a profit motive for police to pursue property forfeiture. Washington
agencies need only prove property is connected to illegal activity by a preponderance of the
evidence to forfeit, or permanently keep, the item. This is the second lowest burden of proof
for civil forfeiture in the country. Moreover, Washington state law allows agencies to retain
90% of the proceeds from forfeited property. Washington also utilizes administrative
forfeitures, which are nonjudicial proceedings handled by an officer of the seizing agency.
These provisions combine to create serious due process concerns in Washington’s civil
forfeiture system.
This Comment addresses these concerns and proposes a reform of the statutory scheme to
eliminate civil forfeiture completely by replacing it with a criminal forfeiture system like New
Mexico’s. Under New Mexico law, property owners must be convicted of a crime before their
property can be forfeited and all forfeiture proceeds are transferred to the state’s general fund.
By funneling forfeitures through the criminal system and eliminating any profit motive, New
Mexico property owners are provided with legal protections that are severely lacking in
Washington’s current civil forfeiture system. Washington should implement similar reforms
to protect the due process rights of property owners and prevent forfeiture abuse by law
enforcement.

INTRODUCTION
Enlisted . . . as a legitimate auxiliary tool in the so-called war on
drugs, the legal doctrines of civil asset forfeiture have since been
perverted to serve an entirely improper function in our
democratic system of government—official confiscation from
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innocent citizens of their money and property with little or no due
process of law or judicial protection.1
An elderly man keeps his entire life savings in cash around his home.
His parents lived through the Great Depression and instilled in him a deep
distrust of banks. At age seventy-nine, the man finally decides to open a
bank account because he worries about the disastrous consequences of a
home invasion. He gives his daughter a Tupperware container with over
$82,000 in neatly stacked bills inside and asks her to deposit the cash into
a joint account for the two of them. The daughter verifies it is legal to
carry such a large amount of cash on to her domestic flight home the next
day. But as she makes her way through airport security, she is stopped and
questioned about the cash. She explains it is her father’s life savings he
gave her to bring home to deposit. The security agents suspect the
daughter is lying. They call her father for corroboration, but he gives
details that do not quite match the daughter’s story. She tries to explain
her father’s fragile mental health. Unconvinced, the agent simply says
“[w]e’re seizing the cash.”2 The daughter is frightened as she watches
strangers walk away with every dollar her father saved. Worst of all, she
later receives a letter from the government notifying her of its intent to
permanently keep the cash. Neither the daughter nor her father did
anything wrong; they broke no law. Yet, civil asset forfeiture statutes gave
the agents full legal justification to retain the cash.3
These events occurred at the Pittsburgh International Airport in August
2019.4 Terry Rolin asked his daughter to deposit his life savings in a bank
for safekeeping when federal agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) seized the money.5 This set off an exhaustive legal battle to regain

1. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS: IS YOUR PROPERTY SAFE FROM SEIZURE? 6
(1995).
2. Justin Jouvenal, The DEA Seized Her Father’s Life Savings at an Airport Without Alleging Any
Crime Occurred, Lawsuit Says, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-dea-seized-her-fathers-life-savings-at-anairport-without-alleging-any-crime-occurred-lawsuit-says/2020/01/15/1d9986e6-36e6-11ea-bb7b265f4554af6d_story.html [https://perma.cc/FZS3-DEGY].
3. DEA Asset Forfeiture, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/operations/assetforfeiture [https://perma.cc/2B85-6MEH] (“To seize property, DEA agents must have probable cause
(the same legal standard needed to arrest someone) and obtain a warrant from a judge (with some
exceptions).” (emphasis added)).
4. See Jouvenal, supra note 2; Torsten Ove, Retiree’s $82,000 Seized by Feds at Airport to Be
Returned, but Lawsuit Continues, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 4, 2020, 7:59 AM), https://www.postgazette.com/news/crime-courts/2020/03/04/Retiree-s-82-000-seized-by-feds-at-airport-to-bereturned-but-lawsuit-continues/stories/202003040116 [https://perma.cc/33GT-UXNP].
5. See Jouvenal, supra note 2.
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possession of the cash.6 Fortunately for Mr. Rolin, a non-profit
organization stepped in to advocate on his behalf.7 Still, seven months
passed before the federal government finally agreed to return Mr. Rolin’s
cash;8 however, others are not so lucky.
Criminals should not profit off their wrongdoing.9 This is the oftrepeated reasoning behind civil asset forfeiture laws that permit law
enforcement agencies to take and keep property they believe is connected
to a crime. At first, this reasoning appears logical: taking away profits
derived from criminal activity is punitive and should disincentivize
lawbreaking behavior. When police suspect an individual committed a
crime, civil forfeiture laws allow police to seize property they believe
“either facilitated a crime or was acquired as a result of criminal
activity.”10 This often includes cash, weapons, electronics, and vehicles,
but it can involve houses and real property as well.11 Generally, if property
owners are unable to successfully contest forfeiture or if they do not
respond to an agency’s notice of forfeiture before a given deadline, the
property and all of its ownership rights are officially forfeited to the
government.12
However, on closer inspection, the reasoning behind civil forfeiture
falters. The irony of lauding asset forfeiture for its punitive and crime
deterrent effects is that property owners facing these proceedings may
have never committed a crime. This was the case for Mr. Rolin and his
daughter. As the name implies, civil asset forfeiture is considered a civil
proceeding.13 Unlike a criminal case, no arrest is required for civil

6. See id.; Ove, supra note 4.
7. Ove, supra note 4.
8. The government did not agree to pay interest on the cash. See id.
9. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974) (“Forfeiture of
conveyances that have been used—and may be used again—in violation of the narcotics laws fosters
the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing further illicit use of the
conveyance and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable.”).
10. Civil Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
11. LISA KNEPPER, JENNIFER MCDONALD, KATHY SANCHEZ & ELYSE SMITH POHL, POLICING FOR
PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 19 (Mindy Menjou ed., 3d ed. 2020).
12. For a sampling of various civil forfeiture standards and requirements, see 18 U.S.C. § 983(c);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-16-12 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712A-10 (West 2021); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:2612 (2020); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5822 (2021); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-530 (2021);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.05 (West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.1 (2021); WASH.
REV. CODE § 69.50.505 (2020); W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-705 (2021); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 961.555
(West 2021); WYO. STAT. ANN § 35-7-1049 (2021).
13. See Civil Law, COLLINS DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/engli
sh/civil-law [https://perma.cc/4BMT-9SE7] (“Civil law is the part of a country’s set of laws which is
concerned with the private affairs of citizens, for example, marriage and property ownership, rather
than with crime.”).
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forfeiture to occur.14 The government does not need to file formal criminal
charges, let alone prove them beyond a reasonable doubt.15 For example,
Massachusetts police only need probable cause to forfeit property they
believe is connected to illegal drug activity.16 Probable cause is the lowest
burden of proof to forfeit in the country17 and requires “more than a bare
suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.”18 The
probable cause standard allows law enforcement agencies to confiscate
property based on minimal grounds. In Washington, the burden of proof
is just slightly higher: officers must show the property at issue is
connected to unlawful enterprise by a preponderance of the evidence.19
The preponderance of the evidence standard is the second lowest standard
of proof for forfeiture in the country and requires that it is “more probably
true than not true” that property is connected to illegal activity.20
Essentially, the government has to show a 51% likelihood that the
property is connected to wrongdoing to divest ownership.21
The ease with which police can take property combines with a
problematic profit motive to increase agency reliance on civil forfeiture.22
Law enforcement agencies may choose to sell forfeited property at a
public auction (frequently conducted online) or keep the property for
department use.23 If an agency auctions the property, it typically retains
between 80–100% of the proceeds.24 Agencies use auction proceeds to
14. Rishi Batra, Resolving Civil Forfeiture Disputes, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 399, 401 (2017).
15. Adam Crepelle, Probable Cause to Plunder: Civil Asset Forfeiture and the Problems It
Creates, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 315, 315 (2017).
16. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 47(d) (West 2021); Policing for Profit: Massachusetts, INST.
JUST., https://www.ij.org/report/policing-for-profit-3/?state=MA [https://perma.cc/9GMRKVKG] [hereinafter IJ MA].
FOR

17. IJ MA, supra note 16.
18. Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
19. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (2020) (setting the burden of proof for forfeiture
related to illegal drug activity). Washington has several different civil forfeiture statutes governing
different areas of unlawful behavior, but they all impose a preponderance of the evidence standard.
See infra notes 236–241 and accompanying text.
20. 6 WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTR. – CIV. § 21.01 (7th ed. 2019).
21. See Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wash. 2d 593, 608, 260 P.3d 857, 865 (2011)
(“[T]he standard of confidence required is a ‘preponderance,’ or more likely than not, or more than
50 percent.”).
22. See Crepelle, supra note 15, at 334–35.
23. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(7)(a)–(b) (giving agencies the choice to retain or sell
forfeited property); see also Elisabeth Leamy, How to Score Big at Government Auctions, on
Everything from Real Estate to Bugles, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.c
om/lifestyle/home/how-to-score-big-at-government-auctions-on-everything-from-real-estate-tobugles/2017/12/28/cfd9a2d0-e415-11e7-833f-155031558ff4_story.html [https://perma.cc/E7TQ-FK
3F].
24. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 34.
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supplement their budgets, so higher value items are lucrative for police.25
These proceeds can then be applied toward anything from bonuses,
trainings, and travel costs, to squad cars, helicopters, and military-style
tactical vehicles.26 If an agency elects to keep the property (typically in
the case of a vehicle), it can use this new asset for undercover operations
and training exercises.27 Often, the only limitation set by the law is that
retained property must be put to “official use.”28 This feature promotes
application of civil forfeiture laws because it rewards agencies for
successful seizures.29
Recognizing the potential for abuse, over half the states in the country
recently reformed their forfeiture laws.30 Changes include reducing profit
motives by decreasing the percentage of forfeiture proceeds that agencies
are allowed to retain, improving legal protections for property owners,
raising the burden of proof on the government, closing loopholes that
allow state and local agencies to circumvent state law by forfeiting
property via federal programs, and increasing agency reporting
requirements.31 New Mexico currently leads the country in reform after
completely abolishing civil forfeiture and replacing it with a criminal
forfeiture system in 2015.32 This means that property owners in New
Mexico must be convicted of the underlying crime to justify forfeiture of
their property.33 These reforms help protect owners’ rights and prevent
25. Id.
26. See William Freivogel, No Drugs, No Crime and Just Pennies for School: How Police Use
Civil Asset Forfeiture, PULITZER CTR. (Feb. 18, 2019), https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/no-drugsno-crime-and-just-pennies-school-how-police-use-civil-asset-forfeiture
[https://perma.cc/SML5J2AY]; Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazin
e/2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/ABB4-YUMU].
27. Bill Bird, Cars Seized in Crimes Generate Lucrative Income for Police, Governments, CHI.
TRIB.: NAPERVILLE SUN (July 23, 2016, 10:46 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/nape
rville-sun/ct-nvs-naperville-vehicle-seizure-law-st-0717-20160723-story.html [https://perma.cc/C2P
C-8RCW].
28. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(7)(a) (“When property is forfeited under this chapter
the board or seizing law enforcement agency may . . . [r]etain it for official use or upon application
by any law enforcement agency of this state release such property to such agency for the exclusive
use of enforcing the provisions of this chapter.”).
29. See Crepelle, supra note 15, at 315–16 (“Placing law enforcement in a revenue generating role
is problematic because it creates tension between raising money and protecting the public.”).
30. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 31 (“[Since 2015,] 32 states and the federal government
have adopted measures limiting forfeiture or altering its procedures.”).
31. See id.
32. See Policing for Profit: New Mexico, INST. FOR JUST., https://www.ij.org/report/policing-forprofit-3/?state=NM [https://perma.cc/2X2C-Z2ZC] [hereinafter IJ NM] (grading New Mexico’s
forfeiture laws with an A—the highest grade of any state—due to its enhanced protections and higher
burden of proof requirements).
33. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4(2) (LexisNexis 2021).
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forfeiture abuse.34
Although many states are making progress with forfeiture reform, some
still enforce laws that encourage agencies to take property for their own
benefit—frequently at the expense of innocent property owners with no
involvement in criminal activity.35 This Comment proposes a major
restructuring of Washington law to abolish civil forfeiture entirely,
implement a strict criminal forfeiture system, and eliminate financial
incentives to forfeit. In Part I, this Comment traces the history of civil
forfeiture laws and describes its modern application. Part II addresses
current criticisms of civil forfeiture laws. In Part III, Washington’s
approach to civil forfeiture is contrasted against New Mexico’s Forfeiture
Act.36 In Part IV, this Comment proposes Washington reform its laws to
adopt a criminal forfeiture system like New Mexico’s. These proposed
changes will protect the due process rights of property owners and prevent
forfeiture abuse by law enforcement. 37
I.

CIVIL FORFEITURE THROUGHOUT HISTORY

Civil forfeiture is not a new concept, although its current application
differs significantly from historical practice.38 The philosophical roots of
forfeiture law extend back to Old Testament scripture.39 The idea that “[i]f
a bull gores a man or woman to death, the bull is to be stoned to
death . . . [b]ut the owner of the bull will not be held responsible”40
became the basis for the theory that property itself may be guilty.41
Medieval Britain then incorporated the theory of “guilty” property into its
common law with the requirement of a deodand.42 A deodand was
confiscated property that caused a person’s death, the proceeds of which

34. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 7.
35. See Crepelle, supra note 15, at 330.
36. H.B. 560, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2015).
37. Rob Poggenklass, Reform Virginia’s Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws to Remove the Profit Incentive
and Curtail the Abuse of Power, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 75, 99 (2016).
38. See, e.g., Leonard v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848–50 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari) (describing how modern civil forfeiture differs from its historical
background).
39. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 330 n.5 (1998) (citing Exodus 21:28) (“The
‘guilty property’ theory behind in rem forfeiture can be traced to the Bible, which describes property
being sacrificed to God as a means of atoning for an offense.”).
40. Exodus 21:28.
41. See, e.g., In re Various Items of Pers. Prop., 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (describing the legal
fiction of guilty property).
42. See John L. Worrall, Addicted to the Drug War: The Role of Civil Asset Forfeiture as a
Budgetary Necessity in Contemporary Law Enforcement, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 171, 173–74 (2001).
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were forfeited to the royal family.43
Over time, forfeiture diverged from its biblical origins and became a
popular enforcement mechanism in British trade and navigation laws.44
The American colonies followed suit and enacted laws authorizing
forfeiture for maritime transgressions involving customs, piracy, and
various admiralty laws.45 Maritime and trade-related violations remained
the basis for civil forfeiture for centuries until legislators began enacting
new forfeiture statutes targeting illegal drug networks in the late twentieth
century to combat the “War on Drugs.”46 Drug crime prevention continues
to be the purported objective of most modern civil forfeiture laws.47 To
facilitate these developments in forfeiture application, federal and state
laws incorporated clauses allowing police agencies to retain proceeds and
simplify the forfeiture process through administrative action.48 These laws
paved the way for a major expansion in forfeiture usage and enabled
American law enforcement agencies to bring in nearly $70 billion dollars
in forfeiture revenue since 2000.49
A.

Origins of Civil Forfeiture

The genesis of civil forfeiture laws traces back to the scriptural notion
of a deodand.50 As United States Supreme Court Justice William J.
Brennan described in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,51
“[t]he origins of the deodand are traceable to Biblical and pre-JudeoChristian practices, which reflected the view that the instrument of death
was accused and that religious expiation was required.”52 The word
deodand comes from “deodandum,” which essentially means “given to

43. Teresa Sutton, The Nature of the Early Law of Deodand, 30 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 9, 9 (1999).
44. See Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446, 2461 (2016).
45. Id. at 2464–65.
46. Id. at 2450.
47. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from
Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 79 (1996).
48. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9.
49. See id. at 15.
50. See Sean M. Grove, Comment, How the Government Can ‘Come and Take It’: Asset Forfeiture
and How Texas Should Change Its Practice, 3 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 121, 123 (2016).
51. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
52. Id. at 681. It is worth noting that some critics take issue with Justice Brennan’s historical
association between the deodand and modern civil forfeiture, preferring instead to cabin deodands to
their specific religious application in accidental deaths and pointing to some evidence that English
courts reject a connection between the two concepts. See, e.g., Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 47,
at 94 (“There is little evidence, however, that modern forfeiture law descended from deodand . . . .”).
The merits of this historical debate are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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God.”53 Under English common law, when an accidental death occurred,
the value of the object that caused the death would be forfeited to the
Crown as a deodand.54 The object owner’s personal liability was
immaterial.55 For example, if a person accidentally sustained a fatal fall
off their neighbor’s horse in medieval England, the horse’s value would
have been appraised and transferred as a deodand to the King.56 Described
as the “price of blood,”57 the Crown would then apply the deodand
towards funeral proceedings for the victim or towards other charitable
purposes.58 Although the deodand tradition went on for centuries, the
religious underpinnings were eventually excised so the object’s value
would be forfeited to the Crown as a “penalty for carelessness” to provide
royal revenue.59
The late United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
described forfeiture as the last vestige of the common law concept of the
deodand.60 Similar to its historical applications, modern applications of
civil forfeiture view the object used in or derived from a criminal act as
“guilty,” rather than the object’s owner.61 This is why forfeiture is
established through in rem proceedings against the property itself rather
than in personam proceedings against the property owner.62 In rem
proceedings derive from the Latin phrase meaning “against a thing” and
they “determin[e] the status of a thing, and therefore the rights of persons
generally with respect to that thing.”63 In rem forfeiture actions concern
the status of the property police allege is connected to a crime.64 Forfeiture
53. WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE, COMPRISING THE OFFICE AND
AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 156 (1795).
54. State v. One 1990 Honda Accord, N.J. Registration No. HRB-20D, VIN
No. 1HGCB7659LA063293 & Four Hundred Twenty Dollars, 695 A.2d 303, 305 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997).
55. Id.
56. See Sutton, supra note 43, at 12–13.
57. Id. at 9.
58. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974).
59. Id.
60. One 1990 Honda Accord, 695 A.2d at 305 (citing O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 25–
30 (1923)).
61. Jack F. Nevin, Tellevik v. Real Property: Washington’s Constitutional Dilemma, 29 GONZ. L.
REV. 303, 306 (1993) (“Civil forfeiture is an in rem civil proceeding in which property is proceeded
against as the defendant premised on the legal fiction that the property is guilty.”).
62. David Benjamin Ross, Civil Forfeiture: A Fiction that Offends Due Process, 13 REGENT U. L.
REV. 259, 269 n.80 (2000) (“An action in personam is one that seeks to determine the rights and
interests of the parties involved, whereas an action in rem proceeds against the property itself to
determine whether the property has ‘committed’ an act of which it is guilty.”).
63. In rem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. See Commonwealth v. 605 Univ. Drive, 104 A.3d 411, 423 (Pa. 2014).
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case names include the government agency pursuing forfeiture and a
description of the property itself—for example, City of Walla Walla v.
$401,333.4465 or State v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler.66 The
property owner’s name is not included because “[t]he thing is here
primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached
primarily to the thing.”67 This twist of legal fiction accounts for why
property owners challenging forfeiture may have to defend the object by
convincing an adjudicator the property was not connected to illegal
activity.68 Essentially, they are arguing their property should be found
“not guilty.”69
While modern civil forfeiture laws appear to descend from the deodand
tradition, the United States never officially adopted this common law
concept.70 The forfeiture laws in the American colonies and later the
United States were more directly influenced by the Navigation Acts of
England.71 English courts strictly construed these mid-seventeenth
century admiralty statutes to protect the English maritime industry.72
Statutory violations justified forfeiture of an entire ship and its cargo
through in rem proceedings.73
Similar to English law, pre-twentieth century American law authorized
forfeiture of ships and the goods they transported when their captain or
crew violated maritime or customs laws.74 Consistent with modern
applications of civil forfeiture, early American courts did not require a
criminal conviction for forfeiture75 and common law expressly held that
courts should pay “[no] regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or
responsibility of the owner thereof.”76 This disregard for the property
65. 164 Wash. App. 236, 262 P.3d 1239 (2011).
66. 215 N.W.2d 849 (Neb. 1974).
67. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
68. The qualifier “may” is used here because in some jurisdictions, the burden of proof is on the
government to prove the property is subject to forfeiture, i.e., “guilty” through its relationship to
illegal activity, rather than on the property owner to prove the property’s innocence. See, e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (2020) (“In all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement
agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture.”).
69. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 47, at 93.
70. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
71. See Navigation Act 1660, 12 Car. 2 c. 18 (Eng.). The Navigation Act of 1660 was just one of
several trade-related acts enacted in the United Kingdom during the seventeenth century that
permitted forfeiture. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 47, at 95–98 (describing the impact
English forfeiture laws had on early American forfeiture laws).
72. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 47, at 95–96.
73. Id.
74. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
75. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 47, at 93.
76. The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844).
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owner’s personal liability stemmed “from the necessity of the case, as the
only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an
indemnity to the injured party.”77 The courts believed that in these
maritime cases (frequently involving piracy), where vessel owners were
often unknown or located abroad, forfeiting the ship and cargo was the
sole method of enforcing the law.78
Eventually, courts began utilizing forfeiture in cases arising outside of
maritime and customs laws. In Dobbins’s Distillery v. United States,79 the
federal government seized a “distillery, the distilled spirits, and distilling
apparatus” as well as the parcel of land the items were located on after the
lessee of the property committed fraud and evaded paying federal taxes
on the liquor he was distilling.80 The Supreme Court of the United States
upheld forfeiture of the seized items and the real property to penalize the
lessee for their liquor tax violations.81 This case laid the groundwork for
the modern expansion of civil forfeiture by using forfeiture as a
punishment for domestic law violations.
B.

Civil Forfeiture in Modern America

Unlike civil forfeiture prior to the 1970s, modern applications typically
target property owners suspected of drug crimes.82 For example, a college
student had $11,000 in cash seized from his luggage at an airport in
Kentucky.83 The student tried explaining to officials that the money was
for his tuition, but the mere presence of a large amount of cash allowed
them to initiate forfeiture under suspicion of drug trafficking.84 The
federal government never brought formal drug charges and only agreed to
return the money after a three year-long legal battle.85 In another example
of modern forfeiture, police in Oklahoma stopped a driver for a broken
taillight and seized $50,000 cash after a police dog indicated the possible

77. Id.
78. See Rachel L. Stuteville, Comment, Reverse Robin Hood: The Tale of How Texas Law
Enforcement Has Used Civil Asset Forfeiture to Take from Property Owners and Pad the Pockets of
Local Government—The Righteous Hunt for Reform Is on, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1169, 1178–79
(2014).
79. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
80. Id. at 397.
81. Id. at 399.
82. See Stillman, supra note 26.
83. Nick Wing, Feds Swiped $11,000 from an Innocent Student. Now, They’re Paying Him Back
with Interest., HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 30, 2016, 4:57 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/charlesclarke-civil-forfeiture_n_583f2470e4b0c68e047e52ec [https://perma.cc/YZ3X-7ZRP].
84. Id.
85. Id.
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presence of drugs in the driver’s car.86 The driver explained he was the
manager of a Christian rock band raising money for schools and
orphanages in Asia.87 Even though this story was fully corroborated, the
government initiated forfeiture proceedings to retain the money and
charged the band manager with a felony for acquiring proceeds from drug
activity.88 After a legal non-profit stepped in to represent the band
manager, the prosecutor dismissed the felony charge for lack of evidence
and returned the cash several months later.89 In Arizona, a seventy-six
year-old man pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to sell
for having fifteen cannabis plants on his property.90 Although he paid a
$25,000 fine and served six days in jail, he still faced the loss of his
twenty-six acre ranch, house, two vehicles, and other personal property to
civil forfeiture.91 Pro-forfeiture legislation significantly increased the
frequency of situations like these and turned modern forfeiture into a
multi-billion-dollar industry for law enforcement agencies across the
country.92
1.

Current Federal and State Legislation

Although civil forfeiture laws have been on the books since America’s
founding, stories like those above were not common until the later decades
of the twentieth century when the government began using forfeiture as a
tool to fight drug crime.93 Beginning in the 1970s and extending into the
1980s, federal and state governments ramped up forfeiture legislation as
part of the “War on Drugs.”94 New statutes gave law enforcement the
86. Darpana Sheth, Police Are Seizing Billions in Property from People Never Charged with
Crimes. It Must End, TIME (July 28, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://time.com/4878195/civil-asset-forfeiturejeff-sessions/ [https://perma.cc/E4E8-HFZ4].
87. Id.
88. Chris Fuchs, Months After $53,000 Seized, Oklahoma County Returns Donations to Christian
Band, NBC NEWS (May 2, 2016, 8:21 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/monthsafter-53-000-seized-charity-donations-returned-christian-band-n565871
[https://perma.cc/7T7HYU8C].
89. Id.
90. Ariz. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Arizona: Civil Asset Forfeiture, VIMEO (Jan. 2, 2017,
6:23 PM), https://vimeo.com/197829505 [https://perma.cc/6ZKL-SYC2].
91. Id.
92. J. Justin Wilson, New Report Finds Civil Forfeiture Rakes in Billions Each Year, Does Not
Fight Crime, INST. FOR JUST. (Dec. 15, 2020), https://ij.org/press-release/new-report-finds-civilforfeiture-rakes-in-billions-each-year-does-not-fight-crime-2/ [https://perma.cc/LQW4-D76W].
93. See Worrall, supra note 42, at 172 (“During the height of the drug war the Asset Forfeiture
Program routinely oversaw amounts larger than half a billion dollars each year.”) (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted).
94. David Osgood, Comment, Crime and Punishment and Punishment: Civil Forfeiture, Double
Jeopardy and the War on Drugs, 71 WASH. L. REV. 489, 489 (1996).
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ability to seize and forfeit property to hit alleged drug traffickers where it
hurt—their wallets.95 The new statutes also allowed seizing agencies to
retain the proceeds derived from forfeited assets.96 This profit motive
incentivizes officers to seize high value items like cash, cars, and homes.97
To further promote application, modern legislation tends to make the
civil forfeiture process easy for the seizing agency. Seventeen states98
(including Washington),99 the District of Columbia,100 and the federal
government101 utilize “administrative forfeiture.” In these nonjudicial
civil actions, the agency seeking forfeiture is not required to formally file
a complaint or petition the court for review.102 Instead, the agency must
notify the property owner of its intent to forfeit, explain the relevant
administrative procedure, and identify the statutory deadline to contest
forfeiture.103 If owners do not contest, they forfeit their property by
default—automatically transferring their ownership rights to the seizing
agency without ever stepping foot in a courtroom or involving a judicial
officer.104 When owners do contest forfeiture, they are channeled through
a relatively informal administrative hearing. A member of the seizing
agency or a government attorney may determine the outcome of the
hearing.105 This raises the potential for bias in the proceedings because the
adjudicator is affiliated with the party seeking forfeiture. Additionally,
some jurisdictions do not allow appeals from these hearings due to
conflicting deadlines for judicial and administrative forfeiture review.106
95. Mary Murphy, Note, Race and Civil Asset Forfeiture: A Disparate Impact Hypothesis, 16 TEX.
J.C.L. & C.R. 77, 80 (2010).
96. See Batra, supra note 14, at 401–02.
97. See Stillman, supra note 82.
98. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 196 n.76.
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (2020).
100. D.C. CODE § 41-305 (2021).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 983; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607–09.
102. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 23.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(4) (“If no person notifies the seizing law
enforcement agency in writing of the person’s claim of ownership or right to possession of items
specified in subsection (1)(d), (g), or (h) of this section within forty-five days of the service of notice
from the seizing agency in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property,
the item seized shall be deemed forfeited.”).
105. See, e.g., id. § 69.50.505(5) (explaining the claim will be heard before the “chief law
enforcement officer of the seizing agency” or an administrative law judge, but allowing the property
owner the option of removing the matter to a circuit court); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 712A-10(6)–(8)
(West 2021) (assigning the attorney general the power to hear and decide administrative forfeiture
hearings).
106. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 712A-10(4); In re Forfeiture of $34,905.00 in U.S. Currency,
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Without the ability to appeal, these property owners are left without
further legal recourse.107
Every jurisdiction has its own procedural requirements for property
owners contesting forfeiture. For example, the federal government
requires owners facing administrative forfeiture to file a claim with the
seizing agency that identifies the property and states their interest under
oath.108 Once an owner asserts their claim, the federal agency must initiate
the formal judicial process by filing a civil complaint in the appropriate
federal district court within ninety days or the property will be released
back to the property owner.109 Other jurisdictions require owners to pay a
fee when they file their claim110 or to post a cost bond of either a specified
statutory amount or a percentage of the disputed property’s value.111 This
bond covers the government’s expenses accrued in defending the
forfeiture if the property owner is unsuccessful in their challenge.112 If the
property owner prevails on their claim, the bond money is typically
returned to the owner.113
96 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120 (D. Or. 2000) (“This case is a belated challenge to a completed
administrative forfeiture by a claimant who failed to comply with the claim and cost bond
requirements [for judicial forfeiture review].”).
107. See, e.g., Forfeiture of $34,905.00, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 (holding that a property owner had
“relinquished his right to file a forfeiture claim” after failing to comply with procedural requirements
and dismissing the owner’s claim).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(C).
109. Id. §§ 983(a)(3)(A)–(B). The federal government may also choose to add the forfeiture
allegation to a criminal indictment and proceed with forfeiture through the criminal justice system.
See id. § 983(a)(3)(C).
110. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169A.63, subdiv. 8 (2020) (requiring law enforcement to give notice
to owners that their seized vehicle will be automatically forfeited if they do not file a lawsuit to claim
it and serve the prosecuting attorney within sixty days). Minnesota’s current filing fee for vehicles
worth less than $15,000 is $65; their current filing fee for vehicles worth more than $15,000 is $285.
See District Court Fees, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.mncourts.gov/Help-Topics/CourtFees/District-Court-Fees.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2021). A proposed bill currently under
consideration by the Minnesota Legislature that would eliminate the forfeiture filing fee for property
owners states that “an average of $226,022 in forfeiture filing fee revenue is collected each fiscal
year” by Minnesota courts. KELLY MOLLER, JUDICIARY FIN. & CIV. L. COMM., HF75 - 0 FORFEITURE LIMITED, INNOCENT OWNER RECOVERY, PUB. SAFETY DEP’T (2021),
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/comm/docs/q0YI3BcSmUiAkqZ3mAe2MQ.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GJQ9-FGEW].
111. See, e.g., Asset Forfeiture Frequently Asked Questions, STATE OF HAW. CRIM. JUST. DIV.,
https://ag.hawaii.gov/cjd/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/M2X9-2GHN]. The State of Hawaii, for example,
requires property owners who choose to contest forfeiture by filing a claim with the presiding circuit
court to pay “a cost bond in the amount of $2500 or 10% of the estimated value of the property,
whichever is greater.” Id.
112. See, e.g., id. (explaining that unsuccessful claimants must “pay the State’s costs and expenses,
including reasonable attorneys fees incurred in connection with the judicial proceeding”).
113. See Michael Sean Devereux, Civil Asset Forfeiture, AVVO (Apr. 16, 2021),
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Additionally, law enforcement officers can persuade property owners
to “consensually forfeit” their property and release all ownership interest
to the agency.114 Often referred to as “roadside waivers”115 due to their
frequent use during traffic stops, these forms may state something to the
effect of “I, _______, . . . the owner of the property or currency described
below, desire to give this property or currency, along with any and all
interests and ownership that I may have in it, to the [government
agency].”116 By signing the waiver, the owner releases their property to
police and limits their ability to contest forfeiture in the future.117 Owners
may be asked to sign these waivers without an opportunity to confer with
an attorney or consider the long-term consequences of their actions.118
Critics have accused police of using high pressure, coercive tactics to
bully motorists into signing these waivers by threatening worse
repercussions if they do not.119 Fearful of potential abuse, Texas,120
Virginia,121 and Wyoming122 enacted policies expressly banning the use
https://www.avvo.com/legal-guides/ugc/civil-asset-forfeiture
[https://perma.cc/PR4A-YNB4].
Ultimately, it is up to the adjudicator overseeing the forfeiture proceeding whether a prevailing
property owner gets their bond money returned. See id.
114. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 44.
115. Id.
116. The quoted language is adapted from a waiver form used by the Wyoming Highway Patrol.
German Lopez, “It’s Been Complete Hell”: How Police Used a Traffic Stop to Take $91,800 from an
Innocent Man, VOX (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:05 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/12/1/16686014/phillip-parhamovich-civil-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/XXL5-MGD3].
117. See George Leef, Another Ugly Civil Asset Forfeiture Tactic—Highway Stop ‘Waivers’,
FORBES (Dec. 4, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2017/12/04/another-uglycivil-asset-forfeiture-tactic-highway-stop-waivers/?sh=6b908dd42fa7 [https://perma.cc/6SFB865R].
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., id.; Stillman, supra note 26 (describing instances in which police threaten serious
criminal charges or removal of children from parents’ custody unless they agree to sign a waiver
relinquishing their property to police).
120. Edgar Walters & Jolie McCullough, Texas Police Made More than $50 Million in 2017 from
Seizing People’s Property. Not Everyone Was Guilty of a Crime., TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 7, 2018, 12:00
AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/12/07/texas-civil-asset-forfeiture-legislature/ [https://perm
a.cc/T4D6-2BX8] (“Gov. Rick Perry in 2011 signed legislation prohibiting the use of such waivers,
forcing all forfeitures to go through court.”).
121. In 2015, the Virginia State Crime Commission recommended prohibiting waivers, reporting
that “[h]aving law enforcement directly ‘negotiate’ with a property owner, without the direct
involvement of a prosecutor and/or an attorney for the owner, can raise the appearance of unfair
dealing or coercion. In other states where this practice became widespread, there have been reports
that the process was abused.” VA. STATE CRIME COMM’N, ASSET FORFEITURE (SB 684/HB 1287) 102
(2015), http://vscc.virginia.gov/Asset%20Forfeiture_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BL6-CTN7].
The following year, the Governor of Virginia reformed state law to prohibit roadside waivers. See
2016 Va. Acts ch. 203, § 19.2-386.2 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-203).
122. German Lopez, Citing Vox Story, Wyoming Bans Practice that Police Used to Take Innocent
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of roadside waivers to forfeit property.
Because the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution123
does not provide the right to an attorney in civil actions, property owners
often attempt to represent themselves in forfeiture challenges.124
However, federal jurisdictions do appoint counsel for low-income
property owners who cannot afford to hire an attorney—but only when
the civil forfeiture is connected to a charged criminal offense125 or when
the property owner is facing the loss of their primary residence.126 Some
jurisdictions also allow property owners who hire private counsel to
recover reasonable attorneys’ fees from the government if they are
successful in challenging the forfeiture.127
If a property owner brings their case before an adjudicator, the burden
of proof standards vary widely across jurisdictions. Twenty states
(including Washington)128 and the federal government129 apply the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in forfeiture
proceedings.130 The burden of meeting this standard may be on the
government, meaning the government must produce enough proof to
show by a preponderance of the evidence the property is subject to
forfeiture.131 However, in some jurisdictions the burden may be on the
property owner to produce enough proof to show by a preponderance of

Man’s $91,800, VOX (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/3/20/17142526/wyoming-waiver-forfeiture-phil-parhamovich [https://perma.cc/F7AC97LJ] (“The new law . . . bans officers from getting people to sign waivers that give up their rights to
property, including cash, without a hearing and without establishing probable cause. Any waivers in
violation of the law are declared ‘null and void.’”).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
124. See, e.g., United States v. 777 Greene Ave., 609 F.3d 94, 95 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[C]laimants in
civil forfeiture proceedings lack a Sixth Amendment right to counsel . . . .”); see also State ex rel.
Eikenberry v. Frodert, 84 Wash. App. 20, 32, 924 P.2d 933, 940 (1996) (quoting State v. Long, 104
Wash. 2d 285, 292, 705 P.2d 245, 249 (1985)) (“[T]here is no federal or state constitutional
requirement that an indigent defendant receive the assistance of appointed counsel where there is no
possibility of incarceration.”).
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1)(A). The statute allows the defendant’s appointed counsel in their
criminal proceedings to also represent them in their forfeiture proceedings. Id.
126. See id. § 983(b)(2)(A).
127. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(6) (2020) (“In any proceeding to forfeit property
under this title, where the claimant substantially prevails, the claimant is entitled to reasonable
attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred by the claimant.”). Importantly, none of Washington’s other civil
forfeiture statutes contain this provision.
128. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 39.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c).
130. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (“In all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law
enforcement agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to
forfeiture.”).
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the evidence their property is not subject to forfeiture.132 Regardless of
which party bears the burden of proof, the preponderance standard
requires a relatively low evidentiary showing.
Not all legislation simplifies the forfeiture process for law enforcement.
Ten states and the District of Columbia utilize some form of a clear and
convincing standard of proof.133 This is an intermediate requirement
between the preponderance standard and beyond a reasonable doubt.134
Sixteen states require a criminal conviction, where the government must
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt135 before property can be forfeited
in civil proceedings.136 Maine, Nebraska, New Mexico, and North
Carolina have abolished civil forfeiture entirely and require agencies
seeking forfeiture to proceed through the criminal system.137 The criminal
process places more demanding requirements on the government and is
more protective of individual rights. These heightened evidentiary
requirements prevent due process violations against property owners and
reduce forfeiture abuse by making it more challenging for law
enforcement to successfully forfeit property.138
2.

The Equitable Sharing Program

The recent increase in progressive forfeiture reforms at the state level
may be frustrated by legislative loopholes that permit seizing agencies to
circumvent their state’s stricter forfeiture laws. This is because a
significant number of civil forfeitures are processed through what is
known as the federal government’s “Equitable Sharing Program”

132. See, e.g., 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-5.04.2(p) (2021) (“In any action brought under this
section, the state shall have the initial burden of showing the existence of probable cause for seizure
or arrest of the property. Upon that showing by the state, the claimant shall have the burden of showing
by a preponderance of evidence that the property was not subject to forfeiture under this section.”).
133. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 39.
134. Clear and Convincing Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Evidence
indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. This is a greater burden
than preponderance of the evidence, the standard applied in most civil trials, but less than evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, the norm for criminal trials.”).
135. Reasonable Doubt, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“‘Beyond a reasonable
doubt’ is the standard used by a jury to determine whether a criminal defendant is guilty.”).
136. See Civil Forfeiture Reforms on the State Level, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/activism/legisl
ation/civil-forfeiture-legislative-highlights/#:~:text=Today%2C%20three%20states%E2%80%94No
rth%20Carolina,criminal%20law%20to%20forfeit%20property [https://perma.cc/5FVW-KZK2].
137. See id.; Nick Sibilla, Maine Abolishes Civil Forfeiture, Now Requires a Criminal Conviction
to Take Property, FORBES (July 14, 2021, 2:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2021/
07/14/maine-abolishes-civil-forfeiture-now-requires-a-criminal-conviction-to-takeproperty/?sh=4eeb65af5cf9 [https://perma.cc/ZWC7-SC44].
138. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 39–40.
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(ESP).139 Created by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,140
the ESP is driven by the familiar “criminals should not profit off their
wrongdoing” rationale. The ESP website states that forfeiture “remove[s]
the tools of crime from criminal organizations, deprive[s] wrongdoers of
the proceeds of their crimes, recover[s] property that may be used to
compensate victims, and deter[s] crime.”141 The program shares federal
forfeiture proceeds with state agencies in two ways: (1) when the state
agency works with a federal agency in a joint investigation that results in
federal forfeiture of property;142 and (2) when a federal agency “adopts”
a state agency’s seizure for federal forfeiture (as long as the underlying
criminal activity that justifies the forfeiture is illegal under federal law).143
The state agency transfers seized property to the federal agency and the
federal agency initiates forfeiture proceedings using federal law
requirements.144 The state agency receives 80% of the funds generated
from the adopted federal forfeiture.145
Proponents of the ESP argue it enhances cooperation and coordination
between different jurisdictions and allows for more efficient forfeiture
processing, but critics argue the ESP is used as a loophole to allow state
agencies to bypass their state laws.146 This is because once a state agency
transfers seized property to a federal agency, the federal preponderance of
the evidence standard applies regardless of the burden of proof under state
law.147 The ESP also allows state agencies to evade their state’s statutory

139. Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870,
929–30 (2015) (“Local departments have sought adoption and received money under the Equitable
Sharing Program even when state laws would not have permitted forfeiture under the circumstances
or would not have given funds to the police department if the state forfeited the property. Many
thousands of law enforcement agencies have participated in the Equitable Sharing Program, and more
than $4.5 billion has been shared.”).
140. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2055 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1616a).
141. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/cri
minal-afmls/file/794696/download [https://perma.cc/L8M6-RZV7].
142. Press Release, Drug Enforcement Administration, Equitable Sharing Program “Takes the
Profit Out of Crime and Benefits Public Safety” (May 19, 2017), https://www.dea.gov/pressreleases/2017/05/19/equitable-sharing-program-takes-profit-out-crime-and-benefits-public
[https://perma.cc/UDJ5-XGVZ]. The amount of proceeds shared with the state or local agency varies
depending on their amount of effort and participation in the case. Id.
143. See Jefferson E. Holcomb, Tomislav V. Kovandzic & Marian R. Williams, Civil Asset
Forfeiture, Equitable Sharing, and Policing for Profit in the United States, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 273, 274
(2011).
144. See Stuteville, supra note 78, at 1185.
145. Holcomb et al., supra note 143, at 274.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 274–75.
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limitations on how forfeiture funds can be used and distributed.148 Over
the last five fiscal years alone, the ESP paid out over $1.5 billion to state
and local agencies across the country.149 The ESP provides large amounts
of revenue to state agencies despite minimal requirements or oversight.150
II.

MODERN CRITICISMS OF CIVIL FORFEITURE

Civil forfeiture creates two serious legal issues: (1) agencies can
permanently take and keep property from innocent people while providing
minimal legal protections;151 and (2) agencies are incentivized to forfeit
property to fund their own budgets.152 These issues have led to widespread
doubt regarding the constitutionality of civil forfeiture laws.153
A 2016 poll found that 84% of Americans oppose civil asset
forfeiture.154 Issues related to law enforcement rarely garner such
bipartisan support, yet Republicans and Democrats appear to have found
common ground in their opposition to civil forfeiture.155 Some critics label
the current sentiment as “[t]he national revulsion against abusive civil
asset forfeiture.”156 This opposition is exemplified in strong statements
such as “[w]hen criminals take property, the law calls it theft. When law
enforcement confiscates property, the process is called civil asset
forfeiture.”157

148. Id. at 275.
149. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., GRAND TOTAL OF EQUITABLE SHARING PAYMENTS (FISCAL YEARS
2016–2020), https://www.justice.gov/afp/reports-0 [https://perma.cc/H5K2-5SSR] (follow the
hyperlinks for each fiscal year under the “Reports to Congress” subheading; then select the report
labeled “Grand Total of Equitable Sharing Payments”). In 2020, Washington state and local agencies
received nearly $7.6 million in forfeiture proceeds through the ESP. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EQUITABLE
SHARING PAYMENTS OF CASH AND SALE PROCEEDS BY RECIPIENT AGENCY FOR WASHINGTON
(FISCAL
YEAR
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/afms/page/file/1361911/download
[https://perma.cc/M65B-K9SK] [hereinafter EQUITABLE SHARING PAYMENTS OF CASH 2020].
150. See Harmon, supra note 139, at 948–49.
151. See Nelson, supra note 44, at 2517.
152. KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 7.
153. See, e.g., Note, How Crime Pays: The Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture
as a Tool of Criminal Law Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2393–96 (2018) (describing a
variety of due process concerns surrounding forfeiture).
154. Emily Ekins, 84% of Americans Oppose Civil Asset Forfeiture, CATO INST. (Dec. 13, 2016,
1:33 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/84-americans-oppose-civil-asset-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/F
R9C-6KVM].
155. Id.
156. Leef, supra note 117.
157. Crepelle, supra note 15, at 315.

Chigbrow (Do Not Delete)

2021]
A.

10/19/21 1:46 PM

POLICE OR PIRATES?

1165

Lack of Constitutional Safeguards

In many jurisdictions, forfeiture laws provide nominal legal protections
for property owners.158 Some commentators label civil forfeiture “an
anomaly” because “it is an exclusively civil remedy based upon criminal
facts.”159 Because of this unusual legal classification, many constitutional
protections that would otherwise be provided in a criminal proceeding are
absent in a forfeiture proceeding: the right to an attorney,160 heightened
proof requirements,161 and protection from double jeopardy.162 Judges
justify the lack of protections by pointing to the “civil” nature of
forfeitures. Because forfeitures are handled through in rem proceedings
against the property itself, property owners are not afforded many of the
due process rights held by a defendant in a criminal case.163 Critics argue
the lack of protections for property owners violates due process and stacks
the deck in favor of the seizing agency.164
Complicating the issue further is the fact that a forfeiture challenge can
take years before the matter is resolved—and law enforcement may keep
the seized property for the duration of the case.165 In Serrano v. Customs
& Border Patrol,166 a vehicle owner waited over two years for a forfeiture
hearing before his vehicle was returned.167 In 2015, federal agents at the
United States-Mexico border seized Mr. Serrano’s 2014 Ford F-250
pickup truck after finding five low-caliber bullets and a handgun
magazine inside.168 The federal government claimed the items were
evidence of an attempt to export “munitions of war” and retained

158. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9.
159. Nevin, supra note 61, at 307; see also Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wash. 2d 376, 378, 721 P.2d 519,
520 (1986) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to an automobile forfeiture
proceeding because it is “quasi-criminal in nature”).
160. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9.
161. See Note, supra note 153, at 2389 (comparing the requirements for criminal, civil, and
administrative forfeitures).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270–71 (1996) (holding that civil forfeitures
do not constitute punishment so as to trigger double jeopardy concerns).
163. See Ross, supra note 62, at 263.
164. See, e.g., David Pimentel, Forfeiture Policy in the United States: Is There Hope for Reform?,
17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 129, 130 (2018) (citation omitted) (“The ease with which property
can be seized, and the procedural presumptions in its favor, make it easy for law enforcement to take
property, even if the legal claim to it is tenuous.”).
165. See Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Steven Rich & Gabe Silverman, Stop and Seize,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2014, at A1.
166. 975 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 209 L. Ed. 2d 546 (2021).
167. See id. at 492, 494.
168. Id. at 492–93.
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possession of the truck pending forfeiture proceedings.169 Despite Mr.
Serrano’s repeated status inquiries and requests for information, “[f]or 23
months, [the government] failed to institute forfeiture proceedings and
Serrano was deprived of his property without a hearing to challenge the
seizure or the continued retention of his vehicle.”170 The government did
not return his truck until Mr. Serrano filed a civil lawsuit against Customs
and Border Patrol in 2017.171 The civil suit made it before the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, where the court held due process does not require
prompt post-seizure hearings.172 Particularly after a year filled with
COVID-19 related court closures, Serrano raises an important issue
regarding the duration agencies can retain seized property pending
forfeiture proceedings. Courts across the country are experiencing a
backlog of cases that will likely result in increased delays in civil
forfeiture proceedings while property is held captive in legal limbo.173
The United States Supreme Court recently offered some constitutional
protection against a different aspect of forfeiture abuse. In Timbs v.
Indiana,174 the Court held state civil forfeitures must not violate the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on excessive fines.175 The case originated after police
seized a $42,000 Land Rover in connection with a criminal charge for
dealing a controlled substance.176 Although the vehicle’s owner, Timbs,
proved that the car was bought with funds from an insurance payout—a
fully legal purchase unconnected to narcotic sales—the police seized it
anyway because Timbs used the car to transport the drugs he sold.177 This
occurred despite the fact the maximum fine for Timbs’s criminal charge
was $10,000.178 A unanimous Court incorporated the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and held a civil forfeiture cannot be
grossly disproportionate to the underlying criminal offense.179 However,
169. Id. at 493–94.
170. Id. at 494.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 500. In April 2021, the Supreme Court of the United States denied Mr. Serrano’s
petition for review. See Serrano v. Customs & Border Prot., __ U.S. __, 209 L. Ed. 2d 546 (2021).
173. See Jenni Bergal, Some States Halt Jury Trials Again, Leaving Staggering Backlogs and ‘a
Lot of People Sitting in Jail’, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2020, 1:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/stor
y/news/nation/2020/12/08/jury-trials-stopped-some-states-backlogs-build-amid-covid-19/6491162
002 [https://perma.cc/7QXX-KLMN].
174. 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
175. See id. at 690.
176. Id. at 686.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 687, 690.
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the Court failed to provide clear guidance on what constitutes an excessive
forfeiture.180 The Court also did not address any of the other constitutional
safeguards missing in forfeiture proceedings.
B.

Profit Motive

Civil forfeiture is a highly lucrative enterprise that has brought in multibillion-dollar revenues over the last two decades to law enforcement
agencies across the country, and this creates concern regarding the
possibility of profit motives.181 Many jurisdictions allow agencies to
retain “most or all” of the proceeds derived from forfeitures.182 These
proceeds fund a variety of departmental needs, including training,
operations, bonuses, and equipment.183 However, agencies have also
applied proceeds to purchase an office margarita machine184 and a $600
coffee maker.185 The profit potential provides a financial incentive for law
enforcement agencies to forfeit property to benefit their department’s
bottom line.186 The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged
the potential for abuse when forfeiture law provides financial impetus to
forfeit by noting that “it makes sense to scrutinize governmental action
more closely when the State stands to benefit.”187
The concerns regarding a profit motive in civil asset forfeiture are not
illusory. An Illinois deputy affiliated with highway interdiction training
programs recently published a book advocating to “turn[] our police
forces into present-day Robin Hoods” by taking valuable property from

180. The Supreme Court found a forfeiture constitutionally excessive just once, in United States v.
Bajakajian, when the federal government attempted to forfeit $357,144 in cash after the defendant
failed to declare it in violation of customs laws. See 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998).
181. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 5.
182. See id. at 34. In Washington, the seizing agency can keep 90% of forfeiture proceeds to fund
their drug interdiction efforts. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(9)(a), (10) (2020). State records show
civil forfeiture brought in an annual statewide average of over $9.2 million in 2016, 2017, and 2018.
See Policing for Profit: Washington, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit3/?state=WA [https://perma.cc/BB6R-8J94] [hereinafter IJ WA].
183. See Freivogel, supra note 26; Stillman, supra note 26.
184. John Clarke, Washington, D.C., Approves Landmark Civil Asset Forfeiture Law, REUTERS
(Nov. 18, 2014, 2:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-districtofcolumbia-forfeiture/was
hington-d-c-approves-landmark-civil-asset-forfeiture-law-idUSKCN0J22J920141118
[https://perma.cc/BG4N-8GZ4].
185. Erin Fuchs, Here Are the Ridiculous Things Cops Bought with Cash ‘Seized’ from Americans,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2014, 12:53 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-what-policebought-with-civil-forfeiture-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/Y9UF-6MA7].
186. See Ross, supra note 62, at 272–73.
187. See Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991)).
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owners to fund police budgets.188 This emphasis on forfeiture has
impacted how departments plan their operations.189 For example, studies
show that Texas law enforcement agencies concentrate traffic stops along
the southbound interstate rather than the northbound.190 These agencies
are operating under the assumption that cars traveling south towards the
United States-Mexico border are more likely to contain large amounts of
cash, while cars driving north are more likely to be carrying drugs.191
Similar tactics were found in studies of law enforcement agencies in
Missouri and Tennessee.192 Seizing and forfeiting cash is more beneficial
to law enforcement because unlike drugs—which must be destroyed—
cash seizures can be forfeited to increase department revenue.193 One
former DEA agent referred to large cash seizures as “the gift that keeps
on giving.”194 This belief pervades cash-strapped agencies across the
country who see civil forfeiture as a quick and easy way to maintain cash
flow.195
With the recent calls for defunding police,196 law enforcement agencies
will be under increased pressure to boost funds through alternative sources
like civil forfeiture.197 Nearly 300 police departments across the country
seize property worth 20% or more of their annual budgets.198 Studies show
that “a substantial proportion of law enforcement agencies reported that
188. Sallah et al., supra note 165.
189. See, e.g., Freivogel, supra note 26 (describing law enforcement methods focusing on
forfeiture).
190. See Jolie McCullough, Acacia Coronado & Chris Essig, Texas Police Can Seize Money and
Property with Little Transparency. So We Got the Data Ourselves., TEX. TRIB. (June 7, 2019),
https://apps.texastribune.org/features/2019/texas-civil-asset-forfeiture-counties-harris-webb-reevessmith/ [https://perma.cc/TWR7-TSGZ].
191. See id. (“Webb County agencies made two seizures . . . from northbound stops after finding
drugs in both vehicles, compared with 16 cash seizures from southbound lanes.”); Harmon, supra
note 139, at 932–33.
192. See Freivogel, supra note 26 (“Police in Missouri, Tennessee and other states focus their
interdiction on the westbound lanes of interstates where cash from drug sales is returning to the cartels.
Far fewer stops occur on the eastbound lanes where the drugs could be seized before they are sold to
users.”).
193. See Harmon, supra note 139, at 932–33.
194. Sallah et al., supra note 165.
195. See Holcomb et al., supra note 143, at 275.
196. See Andy Rose & Hollie Silverman, Seattle’s Mayor Is Set to Sign a New City Budget Cutting
the Police Department’s Funding by 18%, CNN (Nov. 25, 2020, 4:03 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/25/us/seattle-police-budget-cut/index.html
[https://perma.cc/728J6HE9].
197. See David Crockett & Jennifer Earl, Defunding the Police Could Increase Policing if Cuts Are
Too Modest, NEWSWEEK (July 1, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/defunding-policecould-increase-policing-if-cuts-are-too-modest-opinion-1514519 [https://perma.cc/A8PR-6GVR].
198. Sallah et al., supra note 165.
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they are coming to depend on civil forfeiture” to supplement their budgets,
which may increase the potential for abuse.199
C.

Due Process Concerns

As a civil proceeding, forfeiture has minor due process protections in
place despite the major implications it has on an owner’s property
rights.200 This is compounded by the fact that victims of forfeiture tend to
identify with Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC)
communities and low-income communities.201 The Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution unequivocally states that “[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”
in the federal system.202 The Fourteenth Amendment places the same
requirement on the states.203 Together, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee all citizens due process of law.
There are two types of due process: procedural and substantive.204
Courts explain that procedural due process “is not a technical conception
with a fixed content.”205 Instead, it “is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”206 Substantive
due process requirements ensure that government actions do not “‘shock[]
the conscience’ or interfere[] with rights ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’”207 Due process concerns arise in the civil forfeiture
context because forfeiture inherently involves deprivation of property.
In 2017, Justice Clarence Thomas of the United States Supreme Court
wrote an opinion openly questioning the constitutionality of modern civil
forfeiture laws under the due process clause.208 The case arose after police
officers in Texas stopped James Leonard for a traffic violation.209 The stop
led to a vehicle search and police eventually discovered $201,100 and a

199. Worrall, supra note 42, at 179 (emphasis in original).
200. See Ross, supra note 62, at 263.
201. See Christine A. Budasoff, Modern Civil Forfeiture Is Unconstitutional, 23 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 467, 480 (2019).
202. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
204. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (describing procedural and substantive
due process).
205. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
206. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
207. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (citations omitted).
208. See Leonard v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari).
209. Id. at 847.

Chigbrow (Do Not Delete)

1170

10/19/21 1:46 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1147

bill of sale for a house in a safe inside the vehicle’s trunk.210 After
conflicting explanations of the safe’s contents, James stated the safe
belonged to his mother, Lisa Leonard.211 Finding the circumstances
suspicious, police seized and forfeited the $201,100.212 The police
believed the cash was “substantially connected to criminal activity,
namely, narcotics sales,” despite Lisa’s insistence that the cash came from
a home she had recently sold (hence the bill of sale).213
Justice Thomas agreed with the Court’s decision not to accept the case
for review, but opined that modern civil forfeiture had outgrown its
historical maritime roots and likely extended beyond what the United
States Constitution would permit under the Due Process Clause.214 He
pointed out civil forfeiture is penal in nature yet does not provide property
owners the procedural and constitutional safeguards owed to criminal
defendants.215 He also highlighted the profit incentive in civil forfeiture
laws and discussed some high-profile abuses of the civil forfeiture
system.216 He paid particular attention to cases in which law enforcement
targeted low-income and BIPOC communities.217 Justice Thomas closed
by saying “[w]hether this Court’s treatment of the broad modern forfeiture
practice can be justified by the narrow historical one is certainly worthy
of consideration in greater detail.”218
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Leonard has increased doubt surrounding
the constitutionality of civil forfeiture in the modern era.219 Federal
District Court Judge Brian S. Miller “agree[s] with Justice Thomas’s
position in Leonard that civil forfeiture has gotten out of hand and that it
needs to be [reined] in so it is at least loosely tethered to its founding
principles.”220 Justice Geoffrey G. Slaughter of the Indiana Supreme
Court identified “serious concerns with the way Indiana carries out civil
forfeitures” and commented that he is “await[ing] another case—brought
210. Id.
211. Id.; see also Jason Snead, Clarence Thomas Casts Doubt on the Constitutionality of Civil
Forfeiture, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/claren
ce-thomas-casts-doubt-the-constitutionality-civil-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/YMQ3-KSCM]
(discussing Leonard v. Texas in further detail).
212. Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 849.
215. Id. at 847–48.
216. Id. at 848.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 850.
219. See Note, supra note 153, at 2388.
220. United States v. $284,950 in U.S. Currency, No. 4:16-CV-00168 BSM, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 241486, at *10 (E.D. Ark. May 22, 2018).
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by the State or by a private party with a concrete, particularized injury—
to address the important constitutional questions that this and other civilforfeiture cases implicate.”221
Other critics highlight the disparate impacts civil forfeiture laws have
on BIPOC communities.222 It is difficult to precisely pinpoint the impacts
civil forfeiture has on these communities due to inconsistent reporting
requirements;223 nevertheless, it is likely civil forfeiture significantly
impacts BIPOC communities through its application in the highly
racialized “War on Drugs.”224 For example, studies show Black drivers
are nearly 20% more likely to be pulled over than White drivers and, once
pulled over, Black drivers are searched one-half to two times more often
than White drivers.225 Higher levels of police interaction with BIPOC
communities increase the likelihood of property seizure because many
forfeitures originate with minor traffic stops.226
Frequent police interactions result in highly impactful forfeitures for
BIPOC community members. BIPOC individuals are more likely to carry
cash due to long-standing racism in the banking industry227 and
employment positions that pay in cash.228 A 2019 report on forfeitures in
South Carolina found that seven out of ten individuals who had property
seized were Black, and 65% of all cash seizures were taken from Black
males.229 The simple act of carrying what police consider to be a large
amount of cash is deemed a red flag and may be suspicious enough to
221. Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 612 (Ind. 2019) (Slaughter, J., concurring) (arguing the
plaintiff lacked standing to bring their constitutional challenges to forfeiture).
222. Rebecca Vallas, Tracey Ross, Todd A. Cox, Jamal Hagler & Billy Corriher, Forfeiting the
American Dream, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 1, 2016, 6:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2016/04/01/134495/forfeiting-theamerican-dream/ [https://perma.cc/8CZ4-UM6M].
223. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 95, at 79 (noting the lack of studies tracking racial statistics in
civil forfeitures).
224. See Stillman, supra note 26.
225. Research Shows Black Drivers More Likely to Be Stopped by Police, N.Y.U. (May 5, 2020),
https://www.nyu.edu/about/news-publications/news/2020/may/black-drivers-more-likely-to-bestopped-by-police.html [https://perma.cc/SH3V-AGUF].
226. See, e.g., Sallah et al., supra note 165 (describing the “aggressive brand of policing that has
spurred the seizure of hundreds of millions of dollars in cash from motorists and others not charged
with crimes”).
227. See Murphy, supra note 95, at 94 (“Large national banks have historically been reluctant to
open branches in minority neighborhoods, and have been known to offer unsatisfactory loans to racial
minorities.”).
228. See Nathaniel Cary & Mike Ellis, 65% of Cash Seized by SC Police Comes from Black Men.
Experts Blame Racism., GREENVILLE NEWS (Jan. 17, 2020, 4:29 PM), https://www.greenvilleonline
.com/story/news/taken/2019/01/27/south-carolina-racism-blamed-civil-forfeiture-black-men-takenexclusive-investigation/2459039002/ [https://perma.cc/H3X8-5HCS].
229. Id.
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prompt seizure.230 Once their property is seized, BIPOC individuals are
less likely than White individuals to have access to attorneys to
successfully challenge forfeiture proceedings.231 Despite the dearth of
standardized reporting across race and ethnicity statistics, it can be
reasonably presumed that civil forfeiture has a disproportionate impact on
BIPOC communities.232 This racial effect further damns civil forfeiture
on due process grounds.
III. CIVIL FORFEITURE: WASHINGTON VS. NEW MEXICO
Unlike New Mexico, which utilizes a criminal forfeiture system,233
Washington mainly utilizes a civil forfeiture system.234 Washington has
several civil forfeiture statutes, but the law relied on most frequently is
RCW 69.50.505.235 This statute grants forfeiture authority over money,
vehicles, realty, and other property traceable to drug law violations.236
Other Washington laws authorize civil forfeiture of property connected to
illegal gambling,237 sexual exploitation of minors,238 fish and wildlife law
violations,239 tax evasion,240 and unlicensed sale of tobacco products,241
among others. This Comment focuses on RCW 69.50.505 because the
Supreme Court of Washington decides all major civil forfeiture
challenges under this statute.242 However, much of the procedural
language and requirements apply equally to all civil forfeiture laws in

230. See, e.g., Sallah et al., supra note 165 (“For many innocents caught in the seizure net, the
biggest misstep was carrying more cash than police thought was normal for law-abiding citizens.”).
231. See Murphy, supra note 95, at 96–97.
232. Id. at 79 (using anecdotal evidence showing racial bias in forfeiture application to presume a
general disparate impact on racial minorities).
233. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-11 (LexisNexis 2021).
234. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 (2020) (Washington’s most cited forfeiture statute).
235. Id.
236. Id. § 69.50.505(1).
237. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.231 (2020).
238. Id. § 9.68A.120.
239. WASH. REV. CODE § 77.15.070 (2020).
240. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.32.670 (2020).
241. Id. § 82.26.230.
242. For a variety of precedential Washington State Supreme Court cases decided under WASH.
REV. CODE § 69.50.505, see Tellevik v. 31641 W. Rutherford St., 125 Wash. 2d 364, 884 P.2d 1319
(1994); State v. Clark, 124 Wash. 2d 90, 875 P.2d 613 (1994); State v. Cole, 128 Wash. 2d 262, 906
P.2d 925 (1995); State v. Catlett, 133 Wash. 2d 355, 945 P.2d 700 (1997); Guillen v. Contreras, 169
Wash. 2d 769, 238 P.3d 1168 (2010); Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf’t Team v. 115 Freeman Lane,
191 Wash. 2d 654, 424 P.3d 1226 (2018) (all involving interpretations of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 69.50.505). Researching Washington case law did not produce any precedent-setting cases under
any civil forfeiture statute except WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505.
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Washington.
Conversely, New Mexico abolished all civil forfeiture when it enacted
the 2015 New Mexico Forfeiture Act.243 To nullify concerns over the lack
of due process protections in civil forfeiture proceedings, this
revolutionary legislation requires the government to process forfeitures
through the criminal justice system.244 Thus, a property owner in New
Mexico must be criminally convicted—with all the constitutional
protections afforded to criminal defendants—before they can be
permanently deprived of any property traceable to their crime.245 These
new laws also close federal equitable sharing loopholes246 and eliminate
any profit motive driving forfeiture by requiring forfeiting agencies to
transfer forfeiture proceeds to the state’s general fund instead of retaining
the funds in-house as revenue.247 Washington’s minimal legal protections
for property owners navigating the civil forfeiture system and profitincentivizing provisions fall far short of New Mexico’s forward-looking
Act.
A.

Civil Forfeiture in Washington

Washington authorized forfeiture for property involved in drug crime
violations in the 1970s.248 Over the last two decades, Washington
generated nearly $145 million in forfeiture revenue under state law and an
additional $87 million in forfeitures processed through the federal
government’s ESP.249 This has caused some departments to rely on
forfeiture funds to supplement their budget250 and created some concern
among justices on the Supreme Court of Washington bench.251
1.

History of RCW 69.50.505

Washington’s primary civil forfeiture statute, RCW 69.50.505, was
enacted in 1971 as part of the state’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act
243. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-11 (LexisNexis 2021).
244. Id. § 31-27-4.
245. Id.
246. Id. § 31-27-11.
247. Id. § 31-27-7(C).
248. Uniform Controlled Substances Act, ch. 308, § 69.50.505, 1971 Wash. Sess. Laws 1794,
1817–19.
249. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 154. These figures include criminal and civil forfeiture
totals. Id.
250. CITY OF SEATTLE, WASH., Law Department, in 2019–2020 PROPOSED BUDGET 288 (2018),
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/FinanceDepartment/19proposedbudget/LAW.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TKF-D93Q].
251. See City of Sunnyside v. Gonzalez, 188 Wash. 2d 600, 617, 398 P.3d 1078, 1085 (2017).
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(UCSA).252 This statute is used as a deterrent in the War on Drugs and
permits forfeiture of all property connected to or derived from a violation
of the UCSA253—including vehicles, 254 cash,255 and homes.256 Originally,
the only high-value personal property the law allowed agencies to forfeit
were vehicles.257 However, the statute was amended in 1982 to include
forfeiture of money258 and again in 1989 to reach real property.259 The
1989 legislative findings state that forfeiting real property
where a substantial nexus exists between the commercial
production or sale of the substances and the real property will
provide a significant deterrent to crime by removing the profit
incentive of drug trafficking, and will provide a revenue source
that will partially defray the large costs incurred by government
as a result of these crimes.260
To this day, crime deterrence and punishment remain the policy goals of
Washington’s forfeiture laws.261
Additionally, Washington law provides for an administrative forfeiture
process.262 RCW 69.50.505 allows police to seize property once they have
probable cause to believe the property is connected to illegal drug sales or
manufacturing.263 Once an agency seizes property, it must serve a notice
upon the property owner within fifteen days that informs them of their
252. See § 69.50.505, 1971 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1817–19.
253. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 188 Wash. 2d at 615–16, 398 P.3d at 1085 (“[The government] was
required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the property owner’s] car and money
were specifically connected to drug manufacturing, transactions, or distribution.”).
254. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(1)(d) (2020).
255. Id. § 69.50.505(1)(g).
256. Id. § 69.50.505(1)(h).
257. Id. § 69.50.505(a)(4), 1971 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1817 (“The following are subject to
forfeiture . . . all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or intended for
use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale or receipt of
[illegal controlled substances and/or related materials and equipment].”).
258. Controlled Substances—Forfeiture, Seizure of Property—Imitation Controlled Substances,
ch. 171, sec. 1, § 69.50.505(a)(7), 1982 Wash. Sess. Laws 684, 685.
259. Omnibus Alcohol and Controlled Substances Act, ch. 271, sec. 212, § 69.50.505(a)(8), 1989
Wash. Sess. Laws 1266, 1300.
260. Id. at 1298–99.
261. See, e.g., City of Sunnyside v. Gonzalez, 188 Wash. 2d 600, 608, 398 P.3d 1078, 1081 (2017)
(identifying drug crime deterrence and punishment as the intended result of forfeiture).
262. See supra section I.B.1.
263. See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(2)(d) (2020); see also Valerio v. Lacey Police Dep’t, 110
Wash. App. 163, 176–77, 39 P.3d 332, 339 (2002) (quoting Barlindal v. City of Bonney Lake, 84
Wash. App. 135, 141, 925 P.2d 1289, 1292 (1996) (“Under Washington forfeiture law, probable cause
requires the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong to warrant a person of ordinary caution in the belief that the property was used or intended to
be used in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA).”).
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right to challenge the forfeiture.264 If the owner elects to challenge the
forfeiture, the agency’s chief law enforcement officer or an appointed
administrative law judge will hear the case.265 A representative from the
seizing agency must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
property is subject to forfeiture.266 If forty-five days have lapsed since
service and no one has claimed a possessory interest in the seized items,
they are forfeited by default and officially become property of the seizing
agency.267 The window of time before default on real property is extended
to ninety days from the date the notice was served.268 The agency may
sell, destroy, or retain the property for official use once forfeited.269
2.

Application of Civil Forfeiture Laws in Washington

Washington law enforcement agencies are candid about their financial
reliance on civil forfeiture. For example, in the 2019–2020 proposed
budget for the City of Seattle Law Department, the agency requested to
create a new staff position in their civil forfeiture unit.270 The budget
proposal allocated nearly $59,000 for the half-time position and stated
“[i]n 2018 the Seattle Police Department (SPD) increased efforts to seek
forfeitures of real and personal property in civil forfeiture cases. This
increase is expected to continue in 2019. . . . Forfeiture cases provide
revenue to SPD and support for this position is available from these
funds.”271 Moreover, in 2020, the Seattle Police Department received over
$1.2 million in payments from the ESP.272 This figure does not include
proceeds from the agency’s local, non-ESP forfeitures.
Smaller Washington agencies also profit considerably from civil
forfeiture. From 2012 to 2015, the Spokane Police Department in eastern
Washington brought in an annual average of $170,000 from local
forfeiture proceeds.273 One Spokane councilman stated “if someone was
using a vehicle to sell drugs, you get the vehicle. If they were using the

264. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(3).
265. Id. § 69.50.505(5).
266. Id. Property owners may also elect to remove the case to the local district court. See id.
267. Id. § 69.50.505(4).
268. Id.
269. Id. § 69.50.505(7).
270. CITY OF SEATTLE, WASH., supra note 250, at 288.
271. Id. at 288, 289.
272. EQUITABLE SHARING PAYMENTS OF CASH 2020, supra note 149 (totals for fiscal year 2020).
273. Thomas Clouse, U.S. Supreme Court Ban on Excessive Forfeitures Likely Will Affect Spokane
Police, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2019/feb/20/courtconstitutional-ban-on-high-fines-applies-to-/ [https://perma.cc/7RUC-Q83R].
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house, you get the house.”274 In northern Washington, the Whatcom
County Sheriff’s Office received $894,993 from the ESP in 2019—the
highest of any agency in the state that year.275 This is a significant amount
for a department with less than 200 people on staff.276
While Washington law enforcement agencies bolster their budgets with
forfeiture proceeds, property owners are left in the lurch. A 2001 study
found that in King County, 20% of individuals who had property seized
were never charged with a crime.277 Of those who did have formal charges
brought against them, nearly 25% of the cases were eventually dropped.278
In total, almost 40% of all asset seizures did not result in a conviction.279
Nevertheless, most property owners do not get their items back from
police.280 The preponderance of the evidence standard is extremely
deferential to the agency and sets a low bar for justifying forfeiture.281
Additionally, the process to reclaim property is long, confusing, and
expensive.282 Challenging forfeiture often costs more in attorneys’ fees
than what the property itself is worth.283 Low-income individuals facing
forfeiture do not have the right to an attorney for assistance in these civil
proceedings.284 For many, the legal battle is simply not feasible.285
3.

Interpretation of Civil Forfeiture Laws in Washington

Despite the recent push for civil forfeiture reform in other jurisdictions,
Washington courts have not significantly addressed the constitutionality
of civil forfeiture in the twenty-first century. The judiciary has previously
waffled on constitutional challenges to RCW 69.50.505. For example, in

274. Id.
275. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EQUITABLE SHARING PAYMENTS OF CASH AND SALE PROCEEDS BY
RECIPIENT AGENCY FOR WASHINGTON: FISCAL YEAR 2019 (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/afp/page/file/1250761/download [https://perma.cc/4HCN-4KEC].
276. See WHATCOM CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., WHATCOM COUNTY SHERRIFF’S OFFICE PATROL
DEPUTY, https://www.whatcomcounty.us/DocumentCenter/View/32744/Patrol-Recruitment-Broch
ure?bidId= [https://perma.cc/JSQ2-BX6F].
277. Sam Skolnik, Critics Target Drug Raid Seizures, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 13,
2001, at A1.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See supra section I.B.1.
282. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 30.
283. See id. at 6.
284. See State ex rel. Eikenberry v. Frodert, 84 Wash. App. 20, 32, 924 P.2d 933, 940 (1996)
(quoting State v. Long, 104 Wash. 2d 285, 292, 705 P.2d 245, 249 (1985)).
285. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 6.

Chigbrow (Do Not Delete)

2021]

10/19/21 1:46 PM

POLICE OR PIRATES?

1177

Deeter v. Smith286 the Supreme Court of Washington stated civil forfeiture
proceedings are “quasi criminal in nature since their purpose is to penalize
individuals who participate in the illegal transportation of controlled
substances.”287 Because of this quasi-criminal label, the Deeter Court
unanimously held the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to
exclude illegally seized evidence from admission in a forfeiture
proceeding.288 Conversely, in State v. Catlett289 the Court held that
“RCW 69.50.505 is not so punitive as to constitute criminal punishment
for purposes of double jeopardy analysis.”290
In yet another swing of the pendulum, the Washington Court of
Appeals held forfeiture of real property under the “knowledge provision”
of RCW 69.50.505(1)(h) is considered a “punishment” under the Eighth
Amendment.291 This means Washington courts must assess the
proportionality between the alleged criminal activity and the value of the
seized property for excessiveness, among other factors.292 The Supreme
Court of Washington also held a seizure pursuant to civil forfeiture does
not violate procedural due process requirements despite the fact that
seizure occurs without notice or a prior opportunity to be heard.293 The
Court reasoned that a balancing test tilted in favor of the significant
governmental interests at stake.294 These decisions have sat undisturbed
for over two decades now.
Although the Supreme Court of Washington has not directly addressed
the constitutionality of civil forfeiture in recent years, the 2017 case of
City of Sunnyside v. Gonzalez295 provides some hope to those seeking
forfeiture reform.296 In a unanimous opinion, the Court cabined civil
forfeiture by specifying RCW 69.50.505 is meant to address drug
manufacturing, sales, and distribution—not minor-level drug

286. 106 Wash. 2d 376, 721 P.2d 519 (1986).
287. Id. at 378, 721 P.2d at 520–21.
288. Id.
289. 133 Wash. 2d 355, 945 P.2d 700 (1997).
290. Id. at 368–69, 945 P.2d at 706.
291. See Tellevik v. 6717 100th St. S.W., 83 Wash. App. 366, 375–76, 921 P.2d 1088, 1093–94
(1996); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
292. See 6717 100th St. S.W., 83 Wash. App. at 375–76, 921 P.2d at 1093–94.
293. See Tellevik v. 31641 W. Rutherford St., 120 Wash. 2d 68, 87, 838 P.2d 111, 121 (1992).
294. See id.
295. 188 Wash. 2d 600, 398 P.3d 1078 (2017).
296. See Ronald Farley, Not So Fast! Washington’s Supreme Court Takes a Critical Look at Civil
Forfeiture Under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 71 NWLAWYER 14 (2017).
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possession.297 Mr. Gonzales was initially pulled over for speeding.298
However, the police seized his vehicle and $5,940 in cash after they found
a “user amount” of cocaine.299 Based on the cash, the drugs, and the fact
that Mr. Gonzalez’s car was registered to an out-of-state owner, police
believed they had enough evidence to forfeit the cash and vehicle as
property connected to a drug transaction.300 The Court disagreed and
found “no evidence” the cash or the vehicle were connected to drug
production or sales.301 The Court repudiated forfeiture based on
possession of small amounts of controlled substances.302 The Court added
that robust appellate review “is particularly important in the forfeiture
context because an individual may lose valuable property even where no
drug crime has actually been committed.”303 The Court acknowledged the
profit motive in forfeiture and stated “the government has a strong
financial incentive to seek forfeiture because the seizing law enforcement
agency is entitled to keep or sell most forfeited property.”304
More recently, the Supreme Court of Washington handed down a
decision in State v. Blake305 that could have significant implications for
RCW 69.50.505’s constitutionality. The issue before the Court in Blake
was whether Washington’s simple drug possession statute violated due
process because of its associated “substantial penalties for . . . innocent,
passive conduct.”306 The defendant in the case, Blake, had a small quantity
of methamphetamine in the coin pocket of her jeans.307 Blake and other
witnesses testified the jeans were given to her by a friend and she denied
any knowledge of the drugs.308 The trial court held Blake “had not met her
burden to prove that her possession was unwitting” and found her guilty
of felony drug possession.309 However, the Supreme Court of Washington
vacated Blake’s conviction and held the trial court errored because
penalizing “innocent nonconduct” by someone who lacks any guilty intent

297. Gonzalez, 188 Wash. 2d at 608, 398 P.3d at 1081.
298. Id. at 603, 398 P.3d at 1079.
299. Id. at 603–04, 398 P.3d at 1079.
300. Id. at 604, 398 P.3d at 1079.
301. Id. at 609, 398 P.3d at 1082.
302. Id. at 616, 398 P.3d at 1085.
303. Id. at 617, 398 P.3d at 1085.
304. Id.
305. 197 Wash. 2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021).
306. Id. at 173, 481 P.3d at 524.
307. Id. at 174, 481 P.3d at 524.
308. Id. at 175, 481 P.3d at 524.
309. Id.
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violates due process of law.310 Forfeiture could be analogized as similarly
punishing “innocent nonconduct” because the Court has already
acknowledged that property owners may face forfeiture despite never
committing a crime.
In its opinion in Blake, the Court underscored the disproportionate
impact Washington’s drug laws (including RCW 69.50.505) have on
young men of color. The Court cited a 2012 report which “attribute[ed]
Washington’s racially disproportionate criminal justice system to
disparity in drug law enforcement and drug-related asset forfeiture, among
many other causes.”311 The report unequivocally found “Washington’s
drug-related asset forfeiture laws reinforce drug-related law enforcement
tactics that have a disparate impact on racial minorities.”312 Moreover, the
report calls attention to the conflict created by the profit motive inherent
in Washington’s forfeiture laws and how it affects the way agencies make
operational decisions.313 The report also criticizes the preponderance of
the evidence standard of proof by describing it as “one of the lowest in the
country, and . . . highly deferential to law enforcement.”314 This
recognition of the potential for abuse is a promising step toward following
New Mexico’s lead and abolishing Washington’s civil forfeiture system.
B.

Abolishment of Civil Forfeiture in New Mexico

Over the last twenty years, the New Mexico legislature enacted major
changes to its forfeiture laws to better protect property owners and prevent
abuse of the forfeiture system.315 These changes culminated in the passage
of the Forfeiture Act316 in 2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2015 Act”),
in which the legislature fully abolished civil forfeiture and replaced it with
a strict criminal forfeiture system that requires a conviction prior to
forfeiture.317 Although opponents of the 2015 Act predicted a major
increase in crime following implementation, recent studies show this has

310. Id. at 188, 481 P.3d at 531.
311. Id. at 192, 481 P.3d at 533.
312. Rsch. Working Grp., Task Force on Race and the Crim. Just. Sys., Preliminary Report on
Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 655 (2012).
313. Id. at 653–54.
314. Id. at 654.
315. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to 31-27-8 (LexisNexis 2002) (including very few
legal protections for property owners facing forfeiture), with N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to -11
(LexisNexis 2021) (including some of the strongest forfeiture-related legal protections for property
owners in the country).
316. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to -11 (LexisNexis 2021).
317. H.B. 560, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2015).
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not come to pass.318 New Mexico’s current forfeiture laws provide the
strongest protections for property owners in the country and serve as a
model for fellow states with an eye for reform.319
1.

History of Forfeiture Reform in New Mexico

At the close of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico took a close look at the state’s forfeiture laws to address due
process concerns surrounding the burden of proof in forfeiture
proceedings.320 In State v. Nunez,321 the Court held that “[t]he fact that the
State bears a low burden of proof—be it either probable cause or
preponderance of the evidence—when it initiates the deprivation of a
fundamental constitutional right raises grave due process concerns.”322 At
that time, New Mexico’s forfeiture statute was ambiguous as to whether
the government or the property owner bore the burden of proof in
forfeiture proceedings.323 The Court examined different interpretive
arguments and found the law could have been plausibly interpreted to only
require the government to show probable cause that the property in
question was connected to a crime.324 The property owner would then be
forced to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that their property was
not subject to forfeiture.325 This interpretation, coupled with the lack of
“protections that are indispensable in a criminal setting—such as proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, presumption of
innocence, [and] the right to confront one’s accusers,”326 spurred the Court
to shift the burden onto the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the seized property is subject to forfeiture.327
After the Court’s ruling in Nunez at the end of 1999 and its codification
in 2002,328 New Mexico’s forfeiture laws required forfeiture and criminal

318. Nick Sibilla, When New Mexico Abolished Civil Forfeiture 5 Years Ago, Cops Predicted
Crime Would Soar. It Didn’t, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nick
sibilla/2020/12/17/when-new-mexico-abolished-civil-forfeiture-5-years-ago-cops-predicted-crimewould-soar-it-didnt/?sh=5c88f0512729 [https://perma.cc/BL35-PB9J].
319. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 122–23.
320. See State v. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, ¶ 108, 129 N.M. 63, 90, 2 P.3d 264, 291 (1999).
321. 2000-NMSC-013, 129 N.M. 63, 2 P.3d 264 (1999).
322. Id. at ¶ 108, 129 N.M. at 90, 2 P.3d at 291.
323. Id. at ¶ 107, 129 N.M. at 90, 2 P.3d at 291.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at ¶ 109, 129 N.M. at 90, 2 P.3d at 291.
327. Id. at ¶ 110, 129 N.M. at 90, 2 P.3d at 291.
328. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-27-1 to -8 (LexisNexis 2002).
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charges to “be brought in a single, bifurcated proceeding,”329 allowed
public defenders appointed in criminal proceedings to defend property
owners in their forfeiture proceedings, set the burden of proof for the
government at clear and convincing, and enabled safeguards to protect
against excessive forfeitures in proportion to the alleged criminal
offense.330
Despite these turn-of-the-century enactments, the Institute for Justice
rated New Mexico’s forfeiture laws just slightly higher than Washington’s
current rating.331 In 2010, New Mexico scored a D+ on the Institute’s
forfeiture law grading scale because the state still allowed law
enforcement agencies to retain 100% of the proceeds derived from
forfeiture and because they placed the burden on property owners to prove
their “innocent owner” defense.332 Additionally, the New Mexico
legislature did not do enough to curb participation in the federal ESP.333
Between 2001 and 2002, when the stricter state laws were enacted, the
funds paid to New Mexico by the federal government via the ESP nearly
doubled.334
The New Mexico legislature recognized the shortcomings in its early
reform efforts and went even further to curb civil forfeiture abuse by
abolishing its usage entirely in the 2015 Act.335 The new legislation
“require[s] a criminal conviction to forfeit property, shift[s] the burden of
proof from innocent owners onto the government, and set[s] up court
hearings to better ensure due process.”336 The 2015 Act also mandates that
forfeiture proceeds are deposited into the state’s general fund rather than
remain with the seizing agency.337 The stated purposes of the 2015 Act
329. Michelle R. Haubert-Barela, Note, Complying with Nunez: The Necessary Procedure for
Obtaining Forfeiture of Property and Avoiding Double Jeopardy After State v. Esparza, 34 N.M. L.
REV. 561, 567 (2004).
330. Id. at 567–68.
331. Compare IJ WA, supra note 182 (grading Washington’s 2020 forfeiture laws with a D-), with
MARIAN R. WILLIAMS, JEFFERSON E. HOLCOMB, TOMISLAV V. KOVANDZIC & SCOTT BULLOCK,
POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 78 (1st ed. 2010) (grading New
Mexico’s 2010 forfeiture laws with a D+).
332. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 331, at 78.
333. Id.
334. Id. (totaling New Mexico’s 2001 equitable sharing proceeds at $1,157,905 and 2002’s
equitable sharing proceeds at $2,272,066).
335. H.B. 560, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2015); see also Nick Sibilla, Cops Can’t Ignore New
Mexico’s Ban on Civil Forfeiture, Court Rules, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2018, 9:35 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2018/12/19/cops-cant-ignore-new-mexicos-ban-on-civilforfeiture-court-rules/?sh=48f4f0396a7d [https://perma.cc/4V5L-Q6BC] (describing New Mexico’s
abolishment of civil forfeiture and switch to a criminal forfeiture system).
336. Sibilla, supra note 335.
337. Id.
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are to:
(1) make uniform the standards and procedures for the seizure and
forfeiture of property subject to forfeiture;
(2) protect the constitutional rights of persons whose property is
subject to forfeiture and of innocent owners holding interests in
property subject to forfeiture;
(3) deter criminal activity by reducing its economic incentives;
(4) increase the pecuniary loss from criminal activity;
(5) protect against the wrongful forfeiture of property; and
(6) ensure that only criminal forfeiture is allowed in this state and
only pursuant to state law.338
Under the new laws, a property owner must first be criminally
convicted—beyond a reasonable doubt—of an “offense to which
forfeiture applies.”339 The same judge and/or jury340 will decide the
forfeiture matter in an ancillary proceeding if the defendant property
owner’s criminal trial ends in a guilty verdict.341 The government then has
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the seized property was
used to commit the criminal offense, was acquired by way of the offense,
or is “directly traceable to property acquired through the commission of
the offense.”342 Ultimately, the government must prove the following
elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the property is subject to
forfeiture; (2) the property owner was convicted of the underlying crime;
and (3) the value of the property is not unreasonably disproportionate to
the crime.343
Once forfeited, the property is sold by the state treasurer at public
auction.344 The proceeds are used to reimburse the forfeiting agency’s
reasonable
expenses
incurred
in
the
“storage,
protection, . . . transfer, . . . [and] dispos[al] of the property” and the
remaining balance is deposited into the state’s general fund.345 The
drafters of the 2015 Act also made sure to prevent backdoor civil
forfeiture via the ESP. Thus, agencies can only transfer property to the

338. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-2(A) (LexisNexis 2021).
339. Id. § 31-27-4(A). The 2015 Act also allows for forfeiture inclusion in plea agreements. See id.
§ 31-27-4(C).
340. Only forfeiture proceedings where the property is valued at $20,000 or more are eligible for a
jury. See id. § 31-27-6(E).
341. Id. § 31-27-6(C).
342. Id. § 31-27-4(A) to (B).
343. Id. § 31-27-6(G).
344. Id. § 31-27-7(B).
345. Id.
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federal government for forfeiture under the ESP if the property is worth
over $50,000 and the underlying crime was interstate and complex, or if
“the seized property may only be forfeited under federal law.”346 The 2015
Act expressly states “law enforcement agenc[ies] shall not transfer
property to the federal government if the transfer would circumvent the
protections of the Forfeiture Act.”347 These provisions taken together
provide much-needed due process protections and make New Mexico the
leading state in the nation on civil forfeiture reform.348
2.

Implications of the 2015 Act

Despite critics’ predictions to the contrary, the 2015 Act’s legal
advancements have not increased New Mexico’s crime rate.349 New
Mexico’s Department of Public Safety argued losing the significant
revenue stream from civil forfeiture would negatively affect law
enforcement’s ability to investigate criminal activity.350 They anticipated
the change would have “a direct impact on the public safety of NM
citizens.”351 The Chairman of the New Mexico Sheriff’s Association
warned that passage of the bill would mean New Mexico citizens would
“get less law enforcement.”352 Multiple police agencies across the state
sent letters to the governor requesting a veto of the legislation.353 Yet in a
recent study comparing the crime rate in New Mexico to those of
neighboring states, “no significant increase in crime rates” was found.354
This research supports the conclusions that “the reforms had no negative
effect on public safety” and “civil forfeiture is not an essential crimefighting tool.”355
Although New Mexico’s forfeiture reform is a model for other states,
it is not perfect. Some of the main areas for improvement are forfeiture

346. Id. § 31-27-11(A).
347. Id. § 31-27-11(B).
348. See KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 31.
349. See Sibilla, supra note 318.
350. N.M. LEGIS. FIN. COMM., FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, H.B. 52-560, 1st Sess., at 4 (2015),
https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/15%20Regular/firs/HB0560.PDF
[https://perma.cc/69GKUZUK].
351. Id.
352. Ryan Boetel & Dan Boyd, Bill Would Kill ‘Policing for Profit’, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Mar. 28,
2015, 12:05 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/561411/bill-on-seizures-would-kill-policing-forprofit.html [https://perma.cc/B9NY-PZWH].
353. Id.
354. KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 32.
355. Id.
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tracking and reporting.356 The 2015 Act has a clear mandate to annually
report all seizures and forfeitures to the Department of Public Safety,357
but many law enforcement agencies have refused to comply.358 Securing
compliance has proven difficult because the 2015 Act did not include
enforcement provisions.359 While these are valid concerns, they do not
detract from the major due process milestones the New Mexico courts and
legislature have achieved over the last two decades.
IV. ABOLISHMENT OF WASHINGTON’S CIVIL FORFEITURE
SYSTEM
Civil forfeiture is an abusive practice that harms innocent property
owners and incentivizes police departments to forfeit property for their
own pecuniary gain. The forfeiture statutes in Washington are “civil” in
name only. In reality, they are highly punitive criminal statutes yet they
provide only a fraction of the due process protections normally guaranteed
to criminal defendants.360 Therefore, Washington should abolish civil
forfeiture entirely. The Washington legislature should follow New
Mexico’s lead to create a criminal forfeiture system by expanding on
Washington’s current criminal forfeiture statute. This new system must
increase police accountability and eliminate any profit motive by
requiring forfeiting agencies to deposit proceeds in the state’s general
fund. Any ESP loopholes must be closed with explicit statutory language.
Lastly, Washington legislators should improve upon the identified
weaknesses in New Mexico’s criminal forfeiture laws by including strict
enforcement provisions and reporting requirements.
The first step toward abolishing Washington’s civil forfeiture system
begins with acknowledging that RCW 69.50.505 violates due process and
should be found unconstitutional. However, Washington statutes are
afforded a presumption of constitutionality.361 This means that a person

356. See id. at 12 (grading New Mexico’s tracking of seized property at a D-).
357. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-9 (LexisNexis 2021).
358. In 2020, not one single forfeiture was officially reported to the state. See N.M. DEP’T OF PUB.
SAFETY, SEIZURES AND FORFEITURES DETAIL REPORT 1 (2020), https://www.dps.nm.gov/images/
NMForfeiture/2020-Forfeiture-Detail-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2W4-R3M4].
359. See, e.g., Phaedra Haywood, New Mexico Agencies Fail to Report Forfeited Assets as Law
Requires, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (July 22, 2018), https://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/lo
cal_news/new-mexico-agencies-fail-to-report-forfeited-assets-as-law-requires/article_cd7b5b777a19-5941-9145-739ef9803f75.html [https://perma.cc/C9NV-YUXZ] (reporting on compliance
issues among New Mexican jurisdictions); KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 11, at 14 (grading New
Mexico’s penalties for reporting violations with an F).
360. See supra Part II.
361. See State v. Walter Bowen & Co., 86 Wash. 23, 27, 149 P. 330, 331 (1915).
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who challenges a statute on constitutional grounds must “demonstrate its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.”362 RCW 69.50.505 does not set
the government’s burden of proof at guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
For this reason, it should be found constitutionally invalid. Rather than
continuing to rely on the “‘legal fiction’ that ‘[i]t is the property which is
proceeded against, and . . . held guilty and condemned as though it were
conscious instead of inanimate and insentient,’”363 which “prevents courts
from applying constitutional rules that ‘are expressly limited to criminal
cases,’”364 Washington’s civil forfeiture laws should be found
unconstitutional and reformed to eliminate any potential for profit motive
and provide property owners the legal protections that due process
requires.
Over the years, Washington courts have repeatedly acknowledged that
civil forfeiture is “quasi criminal,” but this equivocating label does not
accurately portray its punitive effect. Both Washington state courts and
federal courts have held that a legislative body’s decision on where to
include a statute (whether in a civil or criminal section of legislation) is
suggestive of the statute’s nature.365 RCW 69.50.505’s location in the
UCSA is evidence of its criminal nature.366 Forfeiture is inherently
connected to illegal activity and its placement among Washington’s drug
laws is further proof of this.367
RCW 69.50.505 is overwhelmingly punitive, both in purpose and in
effect. Despite its “civil” label, this law functions as a criminal statute—
yet it is not accompanied by the procedural and constitutional protections
afforded to criminal defendants.368 The Supreme Court of Washington has
admitted “[t]he civil label is not always dispositive” and that “[w]here a
362. Hontz v. State, 105 Wash. 2d 302, 306, 714 P.2d 1176, 1178–79 (1986) (emphasis added).
363. Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf’t Team v. 115 Freeman Lane, 191 Wash. 2d 654, 666–67,
424 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2018) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267,
275 (1996)).
364. Id. at 667, 424 P.3d at 1233 (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 607 (1993)).
365. See, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 19, 857 P.2d 989, 996 (1993)
(attaching weight to the fact the state legislature placed a statute allowing for civil commitment of
sexually violent predators in RCW Title 71, a civil chapter of the Revised Code of Washington);
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (finding that “Kansas’ objective to create a civil
proceeding is evidenced by its placement of the [Sexually Violent Predator] Act within the Kansas
probate code, instead of the criminal code”).
366. See, e.g., State v. Catlett, 133 Wash. 2d 355, 375, 945 P.2d 700, 710 (1997) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting) (“RCW 69.50.505 is part and parcel of the controlled substances act, and it is an overtly
criminal statute which imposes harsh felony penalties for possession and/or distribution of illegal
drugs.”).
367. See, e.g., Lowery v. Nelson, 43 Wash. App. 747, 750, 719 P.2d 594, 596 (1986) (“[The]
government’s right to seize and forfeit . . . vests at the time of the illegal conduct.”).
368. See supra Part II.
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defendant has provided ‘the clearest proof’ that ‘the statutory scheme [is]
so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’
that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal.”369 When
Washington courts succinctly state that “[t]he purpose of forfeiture
proceedings is to punish individuals who participate in the illegal dealing
of controlled substances,”370 they cannot claim that civil forfeiture laws
are truly “civil.”
Because Washington improperly categorizes forfeiture as civil and
continues to adhere to the “guilty property” legal fiction, its forfeiture
laws currently rank as some of the worst in the nation.371 Washington’s
minimal legal protections for property owners are mediocre in comparison
to New Mexico’s progressive criminal forfeiture laws. New Mexico’s
forfeiture laws are currently ranked number one in the nation.372 Although
Washington’s laws do contain some reporting requirements373 and allow
a successful forfeiture challenger to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees,374
the low standard of proof, minimal safeguards for property owners, and
high incentive for profit (through both state forfeiture laws and the ESP)
render Washington’s civil forfeiture regime in need of major reform.375
Washington should adopt a criminal forfeiture regime like New
Mexico’s and prohibit civil asset forfeiture entirely. Interestingly,
Washington already has a law that requires a criminal conviction before
property can be forfeited.376 However, because the government can
choose which statute to seek forfeiture under, the criminal forfeiture
statute is used much less frequently than civil forfeiture under
RCW 69.50.505.377 The criminal forfeiture statute mandates that “[n]o
property may be forfeited under this section until after there has been a
superior court conviction of the owner of the property for the felony in
connection with which the property was employed, furnished, or
acquired.”378 This framework is a start but not enough on its own to protect
property owners. As the relative rarity of forfeiture under Washington’s
369. Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 19, 857 P.2d at 997 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478
U.S. 364, 369 (1986)).
370. Valerio v. Lacey Police Dep’t, 110 Wash. App. 163, 176, 39 P.3d 332, 338 (2002) (citing
Deeter v. Smith, 106 Wash. 2d 376, 378, 721 P.2d 519, 521 (1986)).
371. See IJ WA, supra note 182.
372. See IJ NM, supra note 32.
373. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(8) (2020).
374. Id. § 69.50.505(6).
375. See IJ WA, supra note 182.
376. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.105.010 (2020).
377. The “Citing References” listed for WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 on Westlaw total 547; the
“Citing References” for WASH. REV. CODE § 10.105.010 total 49.
378. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.105.010(1).
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criminal forfeiture statute shows, law enforcement will continue to
process forfeitures through the less restrictive civil system unless it is
declared unconstitutional and replaced with a more protective criminal
forfeiture statutory scheme.
Like New Mexico, Washington should reform its laws to always
require a criminal conviction before a defendant’s property can be
forfeited. This will prevent innocent owners from losing property under
the low preponderance standard currently in place and ensure that law
enforcement uses forfeiture for its stated goals of deterring and punishing
criminals. If the Supreme Court of Washington can recognize that
penalizing someone who unknowingly possessed illegal drugs violates
due process,379 then it should also recognize that permitting the
government to deprive an individual of their property without having to
prove a crime has been committed also violates due process. Reforming
the law to require a criminal conviction or guilty plea and bifurcated
criminal/forfeiture proceedings will demonstrate that Washington’s
justice system values individual rights over state agency profit. This
change will also provide low-income criminal defendants the assistance
of their assigned counsel at the ancillary forfeiture proceeding, further
preventing governmental abuse.
The new forfeiture policy should also require that law enforcement
agencies deposit proceeds from criminal forfeiture into the state’s general
fund. This would eliminate improper profit motives while providing
much-needed resources for Washington schools, because a majority of
Washington’s general fund is spent on public school education.380
Directing proceeds to benefit schools would align with the historical
requirements laid down by the framers of the original Washington
Constitution of 1889 that said the state’s public education fund “shall be
derived381 from . . . the proceeds of lands and other property which revert
to the state by . . . forfeiture,” among other sources.382 The 10% presently

379. See State v. Blake, 197 Wash. 2d 170, 188, 481 P.3d 521, 531 (2021).
380. See McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 495, 269 P.3d 227, 236 (2012) (internal citations
omitted) (“The state general fund, the largest fund within the state budget, provides the primary means
for operating the state government. In the 2005–07 biennium, the legislature appropriated
approximately $11 billion, or 39.7 percent of the state general fund, to support the 295 school districts
that make up the State’s K-12 system.”). In the 2019–2021 biennium, 51.1% of the state general fund
was spent on public schools. See OFF. FIN. MGMT., A GUIDE TO THE WASHINGTON STATE BUDGET
PROCESS 6 (2019), https://ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/legacy/reports/budgetprocess.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8TSB-QNYB].
381. The mandatory use of the phrase “shall be derived” was changed to “may be derived” in the
forty-third amendment to the Washington State Constitution. See S.J. Res. 22, 39th Leg.,
Extraordinary Sess., 1965 Wash. Sess. Laws 2817.
382. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (1889) (amended 1965).
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allocated to the general fund does Washingtonians a double disservice.383
This provision not only encourages police to forfeit property for their own
pecuniary gain, but it also deprives schools (as well as other state-funded
programs) from millions of dollars in revenue every year. Washington can
ameliorate this issue by requiring agencies to deposit 100% of forfeiture
proceeds into the general fund.384
Additionally, Washington lawmakers must be conscientious about
closing loopholes that would allow state and local agencies to bypass
Washington forfeiture law through the ESP. Washington agencies
currently take in millions of dollars in ESP funds every year.385 If agencies
can continue to bypass state law by transferring seized property to the ESP
for federal forfeiture, state enacted protections for property owners and
requirements placed on law enforcement become irrelevant.386 Any new
legislation must contain a clear directive that the criminal forfeiture laws
may not be circumvented.
Finally, Washington legislators should learn from and improve upon
the identified shortcomings in New Mexico’s criminal forfeiture laws.387
Any new policy needs to include strict enforcement provisions to ensure
compliance with the law. There also should be enhanced transparency and
reporting requirements. Agencies should be required to track multiple data
points within forfeiture actions, including but not limited to the date of
property seizure, the seizing agency, the type of property seized, the
assessed value of the property, the underlying crime connected to the
seizure, the property owner’s race/ethnicity, the case outcome, and the
date of property return or transfer of proceeds to the general fund. This
information should be published annually and easily accessible by the
public.
By incorporating the above proposals, Washington would lead the
nation in civil forfeiture reform. First, property owners would be afforded
their constitutional right to due process. Second, law enforcement would
no longer be allowed to funnel property into their department to
supplement their bottom line. Third, the general fund and Washington
schools would benefit from a significant revenue increase. Washington’s

383. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(9) (2020).
384. Similar to New Mexico’s law, costs and fees incurred by law enforcement associated with
storage and transportation of property should be deducted from the proceeds to reimburse the seizing
agency. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-7(B) (LexisNexis 2021).
385. See EQUITABLE SHARING PAYMENTS OF CASH 2020, supra note 149.
386. See Stuteville, supra note 78, at 1184 (“[E]ven with state laws that better protect property
owners, a loophole exists through which state law enforcement agencies can continue to fuel civil
forfeiture abuse by joining in the federal forfeiture system: equitable sharing.”).
387. See supra section III.B.2.
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entire forfeiture system would be more equitable, regulated, and
transparent.
CONCLUSION
Modern civil forfeiture regimes have been repeatedly criticized for
their lack of constitutional safeguards for property owners and dubious
profit motives. Justice Clarence Thomas has expressed clear doubt that
the modern practice of civil forfeiture can withstand a due process claim388
and the Supreme Court of Washington has cast a wary eye toward
Washington’s forfeiture laws in dicta.389 In less than ten years, civil
forfeiture laws across the country have undergone major upheavals as
many states enact more demanding restrictions in response to these
criticisms.390 Thus, the future of civil forfeiture appears to be on shaky
legal ground. This presents a promising opportunity for meaningful
forfeiture reform in Washington. There has never been a better time for
Washington to sound the death knell for civil forfeiture and join the states
who have banned this unjust procedure.
Criminals should not profit off their wrongdoing. However, that is the
crux of the argument against civil asset forfeiture—an individual should
have to be criminally convicted before their property can be forfeited. Law
enforcement should not be able to permanently deprive anyone of their
money, vehicle, or home under a mere preponderance standard, without
ever attempting to bring formal charges. Innocent people like Mr. Rolin
should not have to battle the government for their own property when they
have done nothing wrong. The historical application of forfeiture as a
punishment for piracy has evolved and turned police departments into
marauding bands of officers searching for a profitable property haul.
Police are now more akin to modern day pirates than public servants.
Washington must remedy these abuses by abolishing civil forfeiture.
Washington should implement a criminal forfeiture system based off New
Mexico’s model 2015 Act that requires police agencies to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, transfer forfeiture proceeds to the state
common fund, and follow strict compliance and reporting policies. These
changes would eliminate any profit motive, comport with the
388. See Leonard v. Texas, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari).
389. In both State v. Blake, 197 Wash. 2d 170, 192, 481 P.3d 521, 533 (2021) and City of Sunnyside
v. Gonzalez, 188 Wash. 2d 600, 617, 398 P.3d 1078, 1085 (2017), the Supreme Court of Washington
highlighted potential issues with civil forfeiture.
390. Anne Teigen & Lucia Bragg, Evolving Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES: LEGISBRIEF (Feb. 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/evolving-civil-asset-forfeiture-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/5JDB-2YNH].
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Constitution’s due process requirements, and provide a more equitable
system for Washington property owners. With a criminal forfeiture
system, convicted criminals will not profit off their wrongdoing—but
neither will police profit off “innocent nonconduct.”391

391. Blake, 197 Wash. 2d at 188, 481 P.3d at 531.

